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I. INTRODUCTION
Prisoner rights litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon, taking
root only in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since its incep-
tion, the Supreme Court consistently held firm on two propositions.
First, prison inmates retain the protections of the Constitution, even
though they are incarcerated. Second, corrections officials should be
granted deference when dealing with the difficult task of running a
prison. There is tension between the idea that prison administrators
must be granted adequate leeway to operate the prison effectively,
and that prisoners' constitutional rights must still be vindicated. In
reconciling these competing principles, the Court has consistently
ruled that inmates' claims are judged under less searching scrutiny
than if those claims were filed by non-incarcerated individuals. This
consistency, though, has been eroded by recent Congressional action
and by the Court's 2005 decision in Johnson v. California.' These
events have caused uncertainty in the area of prisoner rights, and
Johnson did an inadequate job of distinguishing itself from earlier
prisoner rights cases.
The Court's prisoner rights jurisprudence was distilled and organ-
ized in 1987 by Turner v. Safley.2 In Turner, the Court was asked to
consider two constitutional claims: the right of inmate-to-inmate cor-
respondence and the right of an inmate to marry. In this seminal
case, the Court first reviewed prior prisoner rights cases and deter-
mined that courts should grant deference to the officials charged with
running the prisons. After distilling several principles from the rele-
vant precedent, the Court articulated the four-pronged "reasonable-
ness" test to examine inmate constitutional claims. The
correspondence regulation at issue was found to pass the reasonable-
ness test, while the marriage restriction was not. Just days later, the
Court applied Turner's reasonableness test to a prisoner's free exer-
1. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
2. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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cise claim in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.3 The Court held that a regu-
lation which prevented certain Islamic inmates from attending
Jumu'ah services survived the reasonableness test from Turner. The
subsequent inmate constitutional cases recognized that Turner had
prescribed a unitary standard, and the Court consistently used the
reasonableness test to evaluate each claim.
Recently, however, there have been changes to this landscape,
opening up a "prisoner's dilemma" for inmate constitutional rights. In
2005, the Court decided two cases involving prisoners' constitutional
rights. First, Johnson v. California determined that short-term race-
based classifications must be evaluated using strict scrutiny. The Cal-
ifornia Department of Corrections employed an unwritten policy of
temporarily housing new and transferred prisoners based largely on
race. With Johnson, two lines of cases intersected: "prisoner rights"
cases, which require Turner's reasonableness test, and racial equal
protection cases, which call for strict scrutiny. The Court ruled that
all racial classifications, including those in prisons, were subject to
strict scrutiny. The Court's other 2005 case, Cutter v. Wilkinson,4 in-
volved inmate free exercise. The background to Cutter begins with
Employment Division v. Smith,5 a 1990 decision where the Court
abandoned strict scrutiny for non-inmate free exercise claims (i.e.,
cases outside the prison context) in favor of a deferential facial review.
After Congress's first attempt to neutralize the effects of Smith was
rebuffed by the Court, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), which statutorily
imposed strict scrutiny on inmate free exercise claims. In Cutter, the
Court determined that passage of RLUIPA did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. Thus, inmate free exercise
claims would be evaluated using strict scrutiny, rather than Turner's
reasonableness test. Then, in 2006, the Court once again used Turner
to evaluate a constitutional claim in Beard v. Banks.6 In Beard, the
regulation at issue restricted an inmate's access to publications and
photographs.
Part II of this Article discusses Turner v. Safley, O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, and the subsequent prisoner rights cases that followed the
Turner standard. Part III discusses the 2005 cases, Johnson v. Cali-
fornia and Cutter v. Wilkinson, including the run-up to the enactment
of RLUIPA. It also includes the 2006 case Beard v. Banks.
Analysis begins in Part IV, which explores the practical conse-
quences of Johnson and RLUIPA. In short, the once-uniform standard
for prisoner constitutional claims has been undermined. Instead,
3. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
4. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
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there is uncertainty. Johnson offered inadequate guidance for when a
departure from the unitary Turner standard may occur. Although cit-
ing relevant precedent for the use of strict scrutiny, the Court did a
poor job of reconciling the Turner prisoner rights cases with the race-
based equal protection cases. This Article will show that the Court's
dismissal of Turner's precedent is ill-founded in light of the cases out-
lined in Part II. Second, RLUIPA shows Congress' prerogative to in-
terfere in the realm of inmate claims. By invoking its spending power,
Congress has effectively altered the scope of free exercise in prisons.
Cutter permitted this action, finding that RLUIPA does not offend the
Establishment Clause. This Article analyzes RLUIPA's Spending
Clause underpinning and finds that, under the current test, Congress
acted within its authority and would be permitted to statutorily
heighten scrutiny for any other right.
What was hinted at in Part IV is stated outright in Part V, namely
that Johnson v. California was wrongly decided. Both precedent and
independent rationale evince that the Turner test is the appropriate
standard of review. The reality of the situation in prisons, particu-
larly events taking place after the Court's Johnson decision, under-
scores the need for deference to prison administrators. Using Justice
Thomas' dissent in Johnson as a guide, this Article then analyzes the
Johnson claim under the Turner standard. Ultimately, the measures
should have passed muster.
Finally, Part VI makes several observations about, and evalua-
tions of, the Turner test. Although Turner is consistently referred to
as a "deferential" standard, a close reading of the test and its prongs
reveals that Turner is, nonetheless, "heightened" scrutiny. The
prongs from Turner effectively "ramp-up" what is otherwise labeled a
"reasonableness" test. In addition, the Court's jurisprudence has com-
plicated matters by discussing whether constitutional rights "survive"
incarceration, and whether some rights are "consistent" with incarcer-
ation. Sometimes, it seems that a right's "survival" or "consistency"
with incarceration is meant by the Court to be a threshold inquiry to
whether Turner should even apply. This Article reconciles the state-
ments made by the Court and concludes that the Turner test is the
proper inquiry for whether rights "survive" in prison. A right's sur-
vival is co-extensive with the permissibility of the challenged regula-
tion. A right's consistency with incarceration, on the other hand, is
not a constitutional resolution, but a consideration of whether that
right survives, or whether the regulation passes muster. Because
Turner is a comprehensive test, there is no need for threshold inquir-
ies, and it remains the most fitting standard for inmate constitutional
claims.
[Vol. 86:279
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II. SETTING THE STAGE: TURNER V. SAFLEY'S
"REASONABLENESS" TEST
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided two cases concerning the
scope of prison inmates' constitutional rights. In Turner v. Safley, the
Court considered the constitutionality of regulations relating to in-
mate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence limitations.
7
The Court rejected strict scrutiny analysisS and announced that
"when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penologi-
cal interests."9 A few days later, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the
Court examined the validity of prison regulations which had the effect
of limiting some inmates' ability to attend religious services. 10 Apply-
ing the Turner "reasonableness" test to the inmates' free exercise
claims, the Court found that the regulations did not offend the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."1 Until 2005, the Court con-
tinued employing the Turner test in all prisoner rights cases.
A. Turner v. Safley and the "Reasonableness" Test
In Turner v. Safley, inmates brought a class action in the Western
District of Missouri challenging two regulations promulgated by the
Missouri Division of Corrections. The first regulation permitted corre-
spondence between inmates at different institutions only if those in-
mates were immediate family members, or if the correspondence
concerned legal matters.12 Other inmate-to-inmate correspondence
was allowed only if the supervisory team for each inmate deemed it in
the best interest of all those involved. 13 The district court found that,
in practice, this regulation effectively prohibited correspondence to
non-family members.14 The second regulation permitted an inmate to
marry only when the supervisor of prisons approved, which required
that there be compelling reasons for a marriage. 15 Generally, only
pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child were considered compel-
ling reasons.16 Relying on Procunier v. Martinez,17 the district court
applied a strict scrutiny standard and found both regulations to be
7. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
8. Id. at 81.
9. Id. at 89.
10. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
11. Id. at 345.
12. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
13. Id. at 81-82.
14. Id. at 82 (citing Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 591 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Turner, 586 F. Supp. at 592).
17. 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989) (only to the extent that Martinez may have applied to a prisoner's incom-
ing mail).
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unconstitutional.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed, agreeing that the strict scrutiny standard applied.19
The Turner Court began its analysis with Procunier v. Martinez,
which had considered the constitutionality of rules that limited the
incoming personal correspondence of prison inmates. 20 In Turner, the
Court found that Martinez had identified two overarching principles
in which to frame the analysis of inmates' constitutional claims.21
First, the courts must recognize valid constitutional claims by in-
mates;2 2 that is, "[pirison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."23 Second,
though, "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform."24 Importantly, Marti-
nez dealt with the narrow issue of "direct personal correspondence be-
tween inmates and those who have a particularized interest in
communicating with them," thus implicating "more than the right of
prisoners."2 5 For that reason, the Martinez Court avoided resolving
"broad issues of 'prisoners' rights."'26 Instead, the Court struck down
the content-based regulations on the basis of the First Amendment
rights of the non-prisoners: "Whatever the status of a prisoner's claims
to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the lat-
ter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of free-
dom of speech." 27  The decision hinged on the prison rule's
"consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of those who are not prisoners."28 Therefore, the Martinez Court
turned to earlier decisions dealing with incidental restrictions on First
Amendment rights for guidance,2 9 finding that "the regulation or
practice in question must further an important or substantial govern-
ment interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," and that
"the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmen-
tal interest involved." 30
18. Turner, 482 U.S. at 83.
19. Id. at 83 (citing Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1985)).
20. Id. at 84-86; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398.
21. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
22. Id. (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405).
25. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408.
26. Id.; Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
27. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408; Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
28. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
29. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409-12 (citing and discussing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
30. Id. at 413.
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After reviewing Martinez, the Turner Court noted that none of the
post-Martinez "prisoner rights" cases applied strict scrutiny.3 1 The
Court held that the Eighth Circuit had erred by distinguishing these
cases and instead applying the less deferential standard from Marti-
nez. 3 2 With this background in mind, the Court declared that "when a
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regu-
lation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests."3 3 This deferential standard, the Court reasoned, provides
prison administrators with the flexibility necessary to effectively run
their institutions and enable them to anticipate security problems.
34
The Court's survey of the post-Martinez prisoner rights cases pro-
vided the platform to enunciate a four-factor test to determine the rea-
sonableness of a regulation at issue.3 5 First, "there must be a 'valid,
rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it."36 For a regulation to
be acceptable, the logical connection between the regulation and the
asserted justification cannot be so remote as to make the policy arbi-
trary or irrational.3 7 Furthermore, the penological objective must be
both legitimate and neutral.38 A second factor is "whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates."39 Where there are other means of exercising the asserted
right, courts should be "particularly conscious of the measure of judi-
cial deference owed to corrections officials."40 A third factor is "the
impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally."41 When accommodation of an inmate's asserted right
would have a significant impact on fellow inmates or on prison staff,
courts should be "particularly deferential to the informed discretion of
corrections officials." 42 Finally, "the absence of ready alternatives is
evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."43 This is not a
31. Turner, 482 U.S. at 86-87 (citing and discussing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prison-
ers' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974)).
32. Id. at 87-88.
33. Id. at 89.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 89-91.
36. Id. at 89 (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586).
37. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
38. Id. at 90.
39. Id.
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Jones, 433 U.S. at 132-33).
43. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)).
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"least restrictive alternative" test: the prison officials do not have to
"set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint."44 However,
the existence of obvious, easy alternatives that fully accommodate the
inmate's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests may
be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable and that the regula-
tion constitutes an exaggerated response to prison concerns.
4 5
Applying this test, the Court found that the rule barring inmate-to-
inmate correspondence was reasonably related to legitimate security
interests.4 6 Specifically, the prohibition was reasonably related to the
valid corrections goals of institutional safety and security, particularly
where communication with other felons is a potential means to crimi-
nal behavior.47 The restriction also does not deprive prisoners of all
means of expression: it only bars written communication with other
inmates, a class of persons with whom prison administrators have
particular reason to limit correspondence. 48 Third, the asserted right
would facilitate the development of informal organizations that would
threaten the core functions of the prison, having a "ripple effect" on
the liberty of guards and other inmates. 4 9 Finally, there were no
ready alternatives to the prison policy, as the monitoring of inmate
correspondence would impose more than a de minimis cost on the
prison.5 0
The marriage restriction, however, did not satisfy the reasonable
relationship requirement. 5 1 Preliminarily, the Court recognized that
the right to marry is a fundamental right that a prison inmate retains
when he enters prison. 5 2 The prison officials identified both security
and rehabilitation as penological goals to justify the regulation. 53
Specifically, the security concern is to prevent "love triangles" that
might lead to violent confrontations between inmates, while the reha-
bilitation interest is in providing self-reliance in female inmates who
were often the subject of abuse at home or who were overly dependent
on male figures. 54 The Court found that the marriage regulation was
not reasonably related to these penological interests, particularly be-
cause prohibiting formal marriages would not eliminate romantic ri-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 91-94.
47. Id. at 91-92.
48. Id. at 92.
49. Id.
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
51. Id. at 91, 94-99.
52. Id. at 94-96 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
53. Id. at 97.
54. Id.
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valries or "love triangles."55 Concerning the rehabilitative goal, the
Court found that the regulation swept far too broadly, particularly
where marriages had been permitted as a matter of course without
incident prior to the enactment of the regulation, and where the regu-
lation forbade all marriages, including inmate-civilian marriages.
5 6
Thus, the correspondence regulation passed constitutional muster,
but the marriage regulation was constitutionally infirm.
B. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
Two Muslim inmates at the New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg
("Leesburg") brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of
New Jersey in 1984. The inmates alleged that prison policies uncon-
stitutionally denied them their free exercise rights under the First
Amendment and sought to enjoin various correctional facility officials
at Leesburg from interfering with their attendance at Jumu'ah, a
Muslim congregational service that takes place every Friday shortly
after noon.5 7 Because of security concerns and staff shortages, Lees-
burg regulations required inmates assigned to outdoor work detail to
remain outside throughout the entire day, except in the case of emer-
gencies. While recognizing that convicted prisoners do not sacrifice all
constitutional protections, the district court noted that those constitu-
tional rights are limited by the legitimate goals and policies of the pe-
nal institution. 58 Relying on the deferential review of prison inmates'
free exercise claims in St. Claire v. Cuyler,59 the district court found
that the regulations plausibly advanced the prison officials' stated
goals of security, order, and rehabilitation.60
En banc, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that St.
Claire provided inadequate protection for prison inmates' free exercise
rights.6 1 Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case. 6 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to "consider the important federal
constitutional issues presented by the Court of Appeals' decision, and
55. Id. at 97-98.
56. Id. at 98-99.
57. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 344-45, 347 (1987); Shabazz v.
O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 928-29 (D.N.J. 1984) affd sub nom. O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In relevant part, the First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof," U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. at 933 (citing St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted)).
59. Id. at 933-34 (citing St. Claire, 634 F.2d at 114).
60. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. at 934; see also O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 347.
61. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986) rev'd sub nom. O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.342 (1987); see also O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 347. Appar-
ently concerned by the district court's application of the St. Claire standard, the
Third Circuit took the case sua sponte.
62. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d at 420; see also O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 347.
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to resolve apparent confusion among the Courts of Appeals on the
proper standards to be applied in considering prisoners' free exercise
claims."63
The Supreme Court in O'Lone articulated several principles which
guided its consideration of the issues presented. "[C]onvicted prison-
ers do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their con-
viction and confinement in prison."64 Prison inmates retain First
Amendment protections, 6 5 including the Amendment's mandate that
no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. 66 However, "[1]awful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system."6 7 "The limitations on the exercise of
constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from
valid penological objectives-including deterrence of crime, rehabilita-
tion of prisoners, and institutional security."68 When considering the
balance of inmates' constitutional rights and the competing penologi-
cal interests, the Court recognized that it generally has deferred to the
judgment of the prison officials "who are actually charged with and
trained in the running of the particular institution under
examination."69
Coming just a few days after Turner, the Court re-iterated that
prison regulations alleged to infringe upon constitutional rights are
judged under a "reasonableness" test-less restrictive scrutiny than
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of constitutional rights:
7 0
"[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."7 1 The Court then analyzed the inmates' claims
using the factors outlined by Turner and determined that the regula-
tions did not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment. 7 2 First, the policies limiting the movement of prisoners were
reasonably related to the legitimate interests of institutional order
and security.7 3 Second, the Leesburg policies did not deprive Muslim
inmates from all forms of religious exercise, including the opportunity
to congregate for prayer or discussion, access to the State-approved
63. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (citing 479 U.S. 881).
64. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
65. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
66. Id. (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)).
67. Id. (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
68. Id. (citing Pell, 427 U.S. at 822-23; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412
(1974)).
69. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 562).
70. Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128
(1977)).
71. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
72. Id. at 350-53.
73. Id. at 350-51.
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imam, arrangements for different meals, and special accommodations
during Ramadan. 74 Finally, the Court evaluated the final two prongs
together, considering the results on other inmates and guards that al-
ternatives would have. 75 The proposed alternatives, placing all the
Muslim inmates in one or two inside work details or providing week-
end labor for Muslin inmates, would, respectively, have the undesired
effect of allowing "affinity groups" in the prison to flourish, and pre-
sent a greater drain on already scarce human resources at the
prison. 76 By applying Turner's reasonableness test, the Court found
that the regulations at Leesburg did not offend the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
C. The Reasonableness Test in Action
Since 1987, the Supreme Court had consistently held that Turner's
"reasonableness" test was the appropriate standard with which to
evaluate inmates' constitutional claims. Although Turner and O'Lone
each deal with specifically defined issues (inmate-to-inmate corre-
spondence and inmate marriage in Turner, and inmates' free exercise
rights in O'Lone), the language of both opinions sweeps broadly. 7 7 In
fact, the Court in Turner stated that the articulation of the "reasona-
bleness" test fulfilled the Court's task "to formulate a standard of re-
view for prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to the
policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the
need to protect constitutional rights."78 For nearly twenty years, the
Court continued to apply the Turner test, or use the principles from
Turner to evaluate inmate claims.
74. Id. at 351-52.
75. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-53.
76. Id.
77. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1987); O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50. Both
cases substantially were decided by the same majority. In Turner, Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Justice Stevens concurred in part
and dissented in part, filing an opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined. Turner, 482 U.S. at 80. Part III-B of the Court's opinion, inval-
idating the prison's restriction on inmate marriages, was also joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id.
The Court's opinion in O'Lone was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
joined by Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 343.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens joined. Id.
In the Court's opinions for both Turner and O'Lone, the Court justifies the use
of the "reasonableness" test in the prison context generally, often describing "con-
stitutional rights," rather than merely those protected by the First or Fourteenth
Amendments.
78. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85-89 (quotation at 85) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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In 1989, Thornburgh v. Abbott dealt with a regulation promulgated
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons which authorized prison officials to
reject incoming publications, including any book, magazine, or pam-
phlet, found to be detrimental to institutional security.7 9 Respondent-
inmates claimed that this policy violated their rights under the First
Amendment, particularly under the standard of review from Marti-
nez.8 0 The district court refrained from adopting the Martinez stan-
dard, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed.8 1 Mandating use of the Martinez standard, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for an individualized determi-
nation of the constitutionality of the regulations.8 2 After reviewing
the procedural history, the Supreme Court clarified that the district
court had been correct-the appropriate inquiry was whether the reg-
ulation was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
8 3
The Court explicitly limited the less deferential standard from Marti-
nez8 4 to regulations concerning a prison inmate's outgoing mail, em-
phasizing that Martinez had focused on outgoing mail and the rights
of the non-inmate.8 5 The Abbott Court noted that when Turner formu-
lated the reasonableness test, it had reviewed the post-Martinez deci-
sions concerning "prisoners' rights."8 6 The Court then prescribed the
Turner standard for the regulations at issue, applied the four factors,
and found that the regulations were facially valid.
8 7
The following year, the Court in Washington v. Harper explicitly
stated that "the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all
circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate
79. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
80. Id. at 403.
81. Id. at 403-04.
82. Id. (citing Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
83. Id. at 404 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Here, Justice Blackmun, one of the
dissenters in Turner and O'Lone, delivered the opinion of the Court, and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in
part and dissented in part.
84. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Martinez standard required the
regulation at issue to be no greater than necessary to further an important gov-
ernmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Id. at 413-14.
85. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-14 (1989). The Court expressed the
view that the logic from Turner and Martinez dictates that Martinez be limited to
regulations on an inmate's outgoing correspondence, as this correspondence does
not invoke the same security concerns as incoming materials. Id. at 413.
86. Id. at 409 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (emphasis added). The
Abbott Court's discussion included most of the cases reviewed by Turner, namely,
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977), and Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
Id.
87. Id. at 414-19.
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constitutional rights."8 8 Harper had been housed in the Washington
State Penitentiary, where he had consented to the administration of
antipsychotic drugs to treat his mental health problems.8 9 After sev-
eral years of incarceration, Harper was paroled, but the parole was
later revoked when he assaulted two nurses in a hospital.90 Upon his
return to prison, Harper was sent to the Special Offender Center
("SOC"), a special institute for prisoners diagnosed with serious
mental illnesses. 9 1 SOC policy permitted physicians to medicate an
inmate over the inmate's objections, as long as certain conditions and
safeguards were satisfied.92
Harper reiterated that when evaluating prisoners' constitutional
claims, courts must consider the State's interests in prison safety and
security and that the "proper standard for determining the validity of
a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional
rights is to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to legiti-
88. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 85)
(other citations omitted). Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
and was joined, as pertains to the use of the Turner "reasonableness" test, by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia.
Id. at 213. Part II of the Court's opinion was unanimous, with all members of the
Court agreeing that the case was not moot even though the State had ceased
administering antipsychotic drugs to the respondent. Id. at 213, 218-19. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 213. Justice Stevens, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
89. Id. at 213.
90. Id. at 213-14.
91. Id. at 214.
92. Id. at 214-17. This policy has several procedural and substantive components.
First, if a psychiatrist determines that a non-consenting inmate should be treated
with antipsychotic drugs, the inmate may be subjected to the treatment only if he
(1) suffers from a mental disorder, and (2) is gravely disabled or poses a likelihood
of serious harm to himself, others, or their property. Id. at 215.
Second, an inmate who refuses to be medicated voluntarily is entitled to a
hearing before a special committee comprised of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and
the Associate Superintendent of the SOC, none of whom may be involved in the
inmate's treatment or diagnosis at the time of the hearing. If the special commit-
tee determines, by a majority vote, in which the psychiatrist must be in the ma-
jority, that the inmate (1) suffers from a mental disorder, and (2) is gravely
disabled or dangerous, the inmate may be medicated against his will. Id. at
215-16.
Third, the inmate has procedural rights in the hearing. He must be given
notice of the SOC's intent to convene a hearing, as well as information related to
the diagnosis and reasons why the medication is necessary. The inmate is per-
mitted to attend the hearing and present evidence, including witnesses, cross-
examine SOC witnesses, and have the assistance of a lay advisor who under-
stands the issues involved and who has not been involved in the inmate's case.
The inmate has the right to appeal the special committee's decision to the SOC
Superintendent and may seek judicial review in state court. Id. at 216.
Fourth, whenever an inmate-patient is involuntarily medicated, that decision
is subject to periodic review. Id.
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mate penological interests."' 93 The Court clarified that this standard
applied to all fundamental rights, not just those found in the First
Amendment,9 4 and noted that Turner itself had applied the reasona-
bleness standard to a prison regulation that impinged on a right guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause, the right to marry.9 5 The Harper
Court found that the first, third, and fourth Turner factors were rele-
vant in that case (and did not discuss the second factor; that is,
whether there are alternative ways to exercise the right at stake).
96
Applying the Turner factors, the Court determined that "given the re-
quirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause per-
mits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dan-
gerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medi-
cal interest."
97
In 1996, the Court decided Lewis v. Casey, which explored the ex-
tent of a prison inmate's right of access to the courts, guaranteed by
Bounds v. Smith.9 s Bounds had earlier held that "the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal pa-
pers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law."9 9 In Lewis, a class of in-
mates from various Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") in-
stitutions brought suit alleging that the prison officials violated their
right of access to the courts.1 0 0 The district court found that ADOC
had failed to comply with constitutional standards, and the court is-
sued a sweeping injunction meant to ensure that prisoners would have
adequate access.1 0 ' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sub-
stantially affirmed,' 0 2 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.1o
3
Evaluating the respondent-inmates' Bounds claim, the Court clarified
that a complaining inmate must show an actual injury to succeed.
0 4
93. Washington, 494 U.S. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
94. Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 224 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-96).
96. Id. at 224-25.
97. Id. at 224-27 (quoted language at 227).
98. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
99. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, cited by Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346.
100. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346.
101. Id. at 346-47 (citing Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1553, 1566, 1569 (D. Ariz.
1992)).
102. Id. at 348 (citing Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1994)).
103. Id. (citing Lewis v. Casey, 514 U.S. 1126 (1995)).
104. Id. at 349-55. The Court also acknowledged that some language in Bounds sug-
gested that the right of access included the requirement that the State enable an
inmate to discover grievances against the prison and to litigate effectively once in
court. Id at 354 (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825-26, and n.14). The Lewis Court
abandoned those elaborations on the right of access. Id.
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In short, the Court found that the inmates only demonstrated two in-
stances of actual injury, and therefore, the sweeping nature of the dis-
trict court's injunction went too far.1O5 Although the Court did not
apply the factors from Turner for such a case, it recognized that Tur-
ner required deference to prison officials and that Turner had held
that a prison regulation that impinged on an inmate's constitutional
rights "is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 0 6
In the 2001 decision of Shaw v. Murphy, the Court was asked to
determine whether prison inmates had a special First Amendment
right to provide legal assistance to other inmates that enhances the
level of constitutional scrutiny available under Turner v. Safley.O 7
Respondent Murphy was an inmate at the Montana State Prison,
where he acted as an "inmate law clerk," assisting fellow prisoners
making legal claims.' 0 8 He sent a note to another inmate, indicating
his desire to help him file suit against a guard.1o 9 The note was inter-
cepted pursuant to prison policy.110 Murphy filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, that his First Amendment right to
provide legal assistance to other inmates was violated.111 The district
court rejected Murphy's First Amendment claim, finding that the
prison's policy satisfied the standard from Turner v. Safley.1 12 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that inmates have a special constitu-
tional right to provide legal assistance to other inmates, 1 13 which al-
ters the Turner analysis by affecting the balancing of the prisoner's
105. Id. at 356-60.
106. Id. at 361 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Justice Scalia deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Parts I and III of the Court's opinion
were also joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The Court's discus-
sion of Turner v. Safley and appropriate deference to prison officials is contained
in Part III.
Justice Thomas filed a separate concurring opinion. He also discussed Tur-
ner's command for deference to prison officials, id. at 387 n.9 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring), and expressed the view that various ADOC regulations "clearly pass
muster under Turner v. Safley." Id. at 389 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987)) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, filed an opinion con-
curring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment. This opinion
also exhibited the view that the district court's injunction did "not reflect the def-
erence [... 1 accord[ed] to state prison officials under Turner v. Safley." Id. at 393
(Souter, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens dissented.
107. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
108. Id. at 225.
109. Id. at 225-26.
110. Id. at 226.
111. Id. at 226-27.
112. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 227 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
113. Id. at 227 (citing Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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interests and the State's. 1 14 The Supreme Court found that no such
special right exists.115 Instead, the Court once again recognized that
constitutional rights held by prisoners "are more limited in scope than
the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large."116
The unanimous Court unequivocally accepted the Turner test, noting
that in Turner, it had "adopted a unitary deferential standard for re-
viewing prisoners' constitutional claims,"1 17 and then spelled-out the
four factors from Turner."18 Ultimately, the Court concluded that
Murphy's First Amendment claims did not warrant an increase in con-
stitutional protection and remanded the case for a determination on
whether Murphy had satisfied his burden under Turner.19
In 2003, the Court considered the validity of regulations promul-
gated by the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") that lim-
ited prison visitation in Overton v. Bazzetta.12o The regulations
essentially limited a prisoner's visitors to qualified clergy, attorneys
on business, and certain family members.12 1 Prisoners who had com-
mitted two substance-abuse violations while incarcerated were not
permitted to receive any visitors other than clergy or attorneys; how-
ever, these inmates could apply to reinstate visitation privileges after
two years. 12 2 Inmates in the highest security-risk category were lim-
ited to non-contact visits; that is, the inmates were required to com-
municate with their visitors through a glass panel.123 Prisoners, their
friends, and family members filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleg-
ing that the restrictions violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.124 The district court agreed with the prisoners that the
regulations pertaining to non-contact visits were invalid,125 and the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
1 26
The inmates' claim was based on a constitutional right of associa-
tion, a right which the Court has recognized as among those least com-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 228.
116. Id. at 229.
117. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The opinion of the Court
was delivered by Justice Thomas, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice
Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Thus, all Justices accepted the Turner stan-
dard as a unitary test for prisoner constitutional claims.
118. Id. at 229-30 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
119. Id. at 230-32.
120. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 128-29 (2003).
121. Id. at 129-31.
122. Id. at 130.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 131 (citing Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
126. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citing Bazetta v. McGinnis, 286
F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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patible with incarceration.127 The Court, once again citing to Turner
v. Safley, found that it did not need to explore further the alleged right
of association, or to what extent it survives incarceration, because "the
challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penologi-
cal interests." 128 The Court outlined the four factors from Turner and,
after evaluating each regulation, determined that the MDOC rules
passed muster. 129 The Court also declined to find that the restriction
on visitation for inmates with two substance-abuse violations consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.130
III. TURNER REJECTED, USURPED, AND THEN REAPPLIED
From Turner and O'Lone in 1987 through Overton in 2003, the Su-
preme Court uniformly applied the reasonableness test. However, in
2005, the Court decided two cases that signaled a departure from this
line of cases. In Johnson v. California, the Court decided that a prison
policy of temporarily housing prisoners based on their race was sub-
127. Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. 433 U.S. 119,
125-26 (1977) (other citation omitted)).
128. Id. at 131-32 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S 78, 89 (1987)). Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 127.
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 137. Justice Stevens wrote separately to under-
score the fact that the Supreme Court earlier had "rejected the view . . .that a
prison inmate is a mere slave. Under that rejected view, the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment would have marked the
outer limit of the prisoner's constitutional rights." Id. at 138 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (citation omitted).
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice
Scalia joined. When evaluating the prisoners' First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims, Justice Thomas suggested that "[riather than asking in the abstract
whether a certain right 'survives' incarceration, the Court should ask whether a
particular prisoner's lawful sentence took away a right enjoyed by free persons."
Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In his view, "States are
free to define and redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to
encompass various types of deprivations-provided only that those deprivations
are consistent with the Eighth Amendment." Id. Thus, the proper inquiry, accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, "is whether a sentence validly deprives the prisoner of a
constitutional right enjoyed by ordinary, law-abiding persons." Id. at 140. He
suggested that the Court's Turner analysis can be read as recognizing that cer-
tain prison regulations-those that satisfy the four Turner factors-are presump-
tively included within a sentence of imprisonment. Id. at 141-42. The opinion
then reviews a brief history of the use of incarceration as punishment, which
supports the view that sentences of incarceration terminate any right of intimate
association. Id. at 142-45. Finally, Justice Thomas concluded that the MDOC
regulations related to visitations were not punishment that violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 145.
129. Id. at 132-36 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
130. Id. at 136-37.
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ject to strict scrutiny.13 1 Later that year, the Court determined in
Cutter v. Wilkinson that Congressional action granting enhanced scru-
tiny to prisoner free exercise claims passed constitutional muster. 132
Then, in 2006, a plurality of the Court in Beard v. Banks once again
used Turner's reasonableness inquiry to determine the constitutional
validity of a prison regulation that limited an inmate's access to publi-
cations and photographs. 133
A. Turner Rejected: Johnson v. California
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine which level of constitutional scrutiny should be used to evaluate
an unwritten policy of the California Department of Corrections
("CDC") that temporarily segregated prisoners based on their race. 134
The Court determined that strict scrutiny was the proper standard,
requiring "the CDC to demonstrate that its policy is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest."135
CDC institutions initially housed all new male inmates and all
male inmates transferred from other CDC institutions in reception
centers for up to sixty days while corrections officials evaluated the
inmates to determine their ultimate placement.136 Assignments for
double-cells at the reception centers were based on a number of fac-
tors, including race. 13 7 Though separation by race was an unwritten
policy, the CDC admitted that there was virtually no chance that an
inmate would share a cell with a prisoner of another race. 138 Racial
groups were further subdivided by the CDC into ethnic and geographi-
cal classifications.139 Citing numerous examples of race-based vio-
lence, the CDC maintained that this practice was necessary to prevent
violence instigated by racial gangs. 14 0 Because of the widespread po-
tential for violence, the CDC claimed that it must segregate all in-
mates while it determines whether they, pose a danger to others.141
With the exception of the reception areas, the rest of the state prison
facilities are fully integrated.142 Following the initial sixty day pe-
riod, the CDC permits inmates to request their own cellmates and
131. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
132. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
133. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
134. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502.
135. Id. at 509.




140. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502-03.
141. Id. at 503.
142. Id.
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usually grants such requests, unless security reasons dictate
otherwise.143
Petitioner Johnson was an African-American inmate who had been
incarcerated since 1987.144 During that time, he was housed in a
number of CDC institutions, and double-celled with another African-
American inmate upon his arrival at each facility.145 Johnson filed a
complaint pro se in the Central District of California, alleging that the
CDC's reception-center policy of housing inmates based on their race
violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 146 The district court dismissed Johnson's complaint for failure
to state a claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.14 7 Af-
ter discovery on remand, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to the prison officials on the grounds that they were entitled to
qualified immunity because their conduct was not clearly unconstitu-
tional.148 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Johnson's claim
should be evaluated using the Turner standard rather than strict
scrutiny.149 Applying Turner, the Ninth Circuit found that the CDC
policy survived the deferential standard.150 After the Ninth Circuit
denied Johnson's petition for rehearing en banc,151 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the correct standard of
review.152
The Court began its analysis by noting that it previously had held
that "all racial classifications imposed by government must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."15 3 With strict scru-
tiny, the government must show that the racial classifications at issue
"are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmen-
tal interests."154 The Court rejected the CDC's argument that their
use of racial classification should not be evaluated under strict scru-
tiny because it is "neutral;" that is, no group or individual is burdened
or benefited by the classification. 155 Instead, the Court followed other




146. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503.
147. Id. at 504 (citing Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000)).
148. Id.
149. Id.; Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
150. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 504-05 (citing Johnson, 321 F.3d at 807 (case below)).
151. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
152. Johnson v. California, 540 U.S. 1217 (2004).
153. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (emphasis added in Johnson) (brackets
and ellipses omitted).
154. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
155. Id. at 506.
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the appropriate standard, even where the racial classifications were
"benign."15 6 The Court further claimed that in 1968, it previously had
"applied a heightened standard of review in evaluating racial segrega-
tion in prisons."157 This case, Lee v. Washington, will be discussed in
greater detail below, in Part IV. Ultimately, the Johnson Court held
that "the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply strict scrutiny
to the CDC's policy and to require the CDC to demonstrate that its
policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."1 58
The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit, or the district court, to
evaluate the claim using strict scrutiny.159
The Johnson Court rejected the CDC's argument that the deferen-
tial Turner standard, rather than strict scrutiny, is the appropriate
standard of review since the racial classification at issue applied only
in prisons.16o The Court reasoned that it had never applied Turner to
racial classifications, and that the Turner reasonableness test had
been used only with rights that are "inconsistent with proper incarcer-
ation."161 The Court then described the situations in which Turner
review was appropriate, cataloguing the cases discussed in Part 11.162
Despite these prior uses of Turner, the Court stated that "[tihe right
not to be discriminated against based on one's race is not susceptible
to the logic of Turner."163 The right need not be compromised for the
sake of prison administration, and, in fact, equal protection "bolsters
156. Id. at 505 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, 515
U.S. at 226; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993)).
157. Id. at 506-07 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)). In
Lee, the Court upheld a three-judge district court decision that "certain Alabama
statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they require seg-
regation of the races in prisons and jails . . . ." Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
158. Id. at 509. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice O'Connor, and
joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, filed a concurring opinion to express the
view that "ameliorative" racial classifications should not be evaluated using the
same standard. Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Court should declare the
CDC policy unconstitutional on the current record, without the need to remand
the case. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, dissented. Justice Thomas expressed the view that that the racial classifi-
cation used by the CDC should be tested under the standard in Turner, rather
than subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 529 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Applying the
relevant factors, Justice Thomas concluded that the CDC policy passed constitu-
tional muster. Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.
159. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
160. Id. at 509 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
161. Id. at 510 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
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the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system."' 6 4 The Turner
test, the Court felt, was too lenient a standard to "ferret out invidious
uses of race."' 65 This standard would permit prison officials to use
race-based policies even where race-neutral ones would accomplish
the same goal. 166 The CDC argued that strict scrutiny did not provide
corrections officials with adequate means to address prison difficul-
ties; however, the Court noted that the narrow tailoring requirement
of strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal in fact and remanded the case
for a determination.
16 7
B. Turner Usurped: RLUIPA and Cutter v. Wilkinson
Section three of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") provides in part that "[n]o government
shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden furthers a
"compelling government interest," and does so by "the least restrictive
means."168 In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court held that section three of
RLUIPA did not exceed the limits of permissible government accom-
modation of religious practices under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.169
1. Employment Division v. Smith's Deferential Free Exercise
Standard
Ten years before RLUIPA's enactment, the Supreme Court in Em-
ployment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith considered the issue of whether generally applicable state ac-
tion violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
170
Specifically, the Smith Court evaluated the validity of an Oregon law
which prohibited possession of a "controlled substance" unless it had
been prescribed by a medical practitioner.171 Included among the for-
bidden substances was the drug peyote, which is used for sacramental
purposes by the Native American Church. 17 2 Although the Court rec-
ognized that the government is not permitted to regulate an individ-
ual's beliefs, governments may enact generally applicable laws that
have the incidental effect of burdening religious exercise. 1 73 Smith
164. Id. at 510-11.
165. Id. at 513.
166. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 513.
167. Id. at 514-15.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(1)(a)-(2) (2000).
169. 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005).
170. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
171. Id. at 874 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)).
172. Id. (citing OR. ADMIN. R. 555-80-021(3)(s) (1988)).
173. Id. at 877-80.
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recognized, though, that drug laws would be permitted to have excep-
tions for sacramental peyote use.
17 4
In a surprising departure from previous free exercise jurispru-
dence, the Court rejected its previous use of the "compelling interest"
test developed in Sherbert v. Verner, whereby government actions that
burdened an individual's free exercise had to be justified by a compel-
ling state interest.' 7 5 The Smith Court distinguished Sherbert and
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual from
complying with valid and neutral laws of general applicability, so long
as the general law is not aimed at the promotion or restriction of relig-
ious beliefs.176 In other words, so long as a law is neutral and not
motivated by religious discrimination, it is valid, and there shall be no
exemption. Thus, the Court abandoned heightened scrutiny for free
exercise claims.177
Although Smith seemed to make subsequent free exercise claims
extremely difficult to win, 178 the Court did not close all means for
meaningful free exercise review.17 9 The Court acknowledged that
precedent required heightened scrutiny in situations where state un-
employment benefits were conditioned on an applicant's willingness to
work under conditions forbidden by his religion, such as in Sher-
bert.18 o The Court also described "hybrid" claims, which would re-
ceive heightened scrutiny, and exist where a claimant combines his
free exercise challenge with a claim that another constitutionally-
based right was being infringed by the same regulation. Finally, as
mentioned above, Smith explicitly acknowledged that the government
was not permitted to impose "special disabilities on the basis of relig-
ious views or religious status."18
174. Id. at 890.
175. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). If a governmental action is to with-
stand constitutional challenge, it must be either because there is "no infringe-
ment by the State of [an individual's] constitutional rights of free exercise, or
because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate . "Id. (internal quotations omitted).
176. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-85.
177. See id. at 885-86.
178. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1416 (1992) ("The Smith decision
undoubtedly completed the Court's gutting of the Free Exercise Clause . . ").
179. See Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Re-
ligious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 680-84 (1991).
180. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Fl., 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
181. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to, and striking down, a
local ordinance which was motivated by animus toward certain religious prac-
tices). See also Choper, supra note 179, at 683.
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Both Smith and O'Lone afford great deference to government offi-
cials when considering free exercise claims; however the two stan-
dards of review are not the same. The Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits both explicitly recognized that the Turner
inquiry adopted by O'Lone puts the regulation at issue through a more
rigorous test than would Smith.182 Because Smith and Turner/O'Lone
employed different tests, there was the possibility that courts would
apply divergent tests for inmate free exercise claims: O'Lone specifi-
cally adopted the Turner test for inmate free exercise claims; yet,
Smith had established a blanket rule for all laws of general applicabil-
ity. Most courts continued to follow O'Lone by applying the Turner
test for inmate free exercise claims without even mentioning
Smith.183 Other cases suggested that there might be some ambiguity.
In a Seventh Circuit case decided after Smith, but filed before it,
Judge Posner stated that the prison regulations would be valid if they
were reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.' 8 4 How-
ever, Judge Posner posited that Smith might "give the [prison offi-
cials] a good defense" and suggested that the issue was one which
could be explored on remand.' 8 5 Although there is no published sub-
sequent history of that case, the Seventh Circuit found in a later case
that "review of [prison inmates'] first amendment claims is governed
by the Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley," without any
mention of Smith.18 6
The Ninth Circuit, in its first post-Smith prisoner free exercise
case, examined the claim using the reasonableness test.'8 7 Three
years later, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the use of Smith to
evaluate inmate free exercise claims, noting that the Supreme Court
had held that Turner applied to all constitutional claims raised by
182. See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Smith cut back, possibly
to minute dimensions, the doctrine that requires government to accommodate, at
some cost, minority religious preferences: the doctrine on which all the prison
religion cases are founded."); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993).
183. See, e.g., Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1991); Clifton v. Craig, 924
F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1991); Akbar v. Borgen, 803 F. Supp 1479 (E.D. Wisc. 1992);
Stroud v. Roth, 741 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Pa. 1990). For a discussion of how Smith
might require an overlay onto judicial inquiry for prisoner free exercise claims,
see Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First Amendment Values: The Prison-
ers' Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1644 (1991).
184. Hunafa, 907 F.2d at 47 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 428 U.S. 342, 353
(1987)).
185. Id. at 48.
186. Al-Alamin, 926 F.2d at 685.
187. Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1990). The court noted that it
had "not considered whether prisoner rights have been further limited as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith because the
[inmates] cannot overcome the Turner test." Id. at 331 n.1 (citation omitted).
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prison inmates.1 8 8 In sum, nearly all inmate free exercise claims con-
tinued to be evaluated under the Turner "reasonableness" test, with
the courts rejecting, either explicitly or implicitly, the use of the Smith
standard in the prison context.189
Ironically, the courts' decisions to continue applying Turner review
led to the anomalous result that prison inmates' free exercise claims
received more exacting review than would non-incarcerated individu-
als' claims that a statute or regulation had infringed upon their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause. Although there is no constitutional
impediment to evaluating prison inmates' claims with a higher stan-
dard than for non-inmates, to do so seems backward. In fact, the
O'Lone Court announced that prison regulations are judged under a
test "less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringe-
ments of fundamental constitutional rights."19o
Thus, Smith created a paradox. The general population, which is
not encumbered with the fact of incarceration, cannot be exempt from
a neutral law of general applicability. Without a new standard specif-
ically for prison inmate claims, the lower courts continued to use the
"reasonableness" test. Therefore, inmates' free exercise claims would
be judged under more enhanced scrutiny than ordinarily applied to al-
leged infringements of constitutional rights.
2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and City of Boerne v.
Flores
In response to Smith's abandonment of the "compelling interest"
test, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA").191 Congress found that neutral laws could "burden relig-
ious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious ex-
ercise"19 2 and that governments should not substantially burden
188. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990)). The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Smith presented a
factual situation much different from those which arise in the prison context: the
extent to which a prison official must accommodate a prisoner's free exercise
rights is quite different from determining the validity of criminal laws of general
applicability. Id. at 877. The court also noted that this excluded Eighth Amend-
ment claims. Id.
189. Still, some courts evaluated prisoners' free exercise claims referencing neither
O'Lone's use of Turner nor Smith. See, e.g., Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162 (8th
Cir. 1992); Fominas v. Kelly, 739 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
190. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (emphasis added). This
proposition rests on the idea that an effectively functioning penal system requires
limitations on prisoner rights, both from the "fact of incarceration and from valid
penological objectives." Id. at 348.
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (2000), subsequently held to be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the states and municipalities by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
192. Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
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individuals' religious exercise rights without compelling justifica-
tion. 193 Congress rejected the finding in Employment Division v.
Smith, which abandoned strict scrutiny for free exercise claims,194
and stated that the purpose of RFRA was to restore the "compelling
interest" test to free exercise claims. 19 5 Specifically, RFRA prohibited
the government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicabil-
ity, unless the government could demonstrate that the application of
the burden was (1) in furtherance of a compelling government inter-
est; and (2) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 9 6 RFRA was "universal" in its coverage,
19 7
applying to all federal and state law, but notably lacked a Commerce
Clause or Spending Clause basis for its enactment.198 In 1997, the
Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was unconstitutional
as applied to states and municipalities because Congress had ex-
ceeded its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.19 9 Neither RFRA nor City of Boerne v. Flores drew a distinction
between claims by prison inmates or non-inmates. 2 00
3. Congress Strikes Back: The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act
Congress began hearings on a new religious protection act less
than one month after the Court decided City of Boerne.2 0 ' The U.S.
House of Representatives started crafting new legislation with sweep-
193. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3).
194. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4).
195. Id. § 2000bb(b).
196. Id. § 2000bb-1.
197. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (citing former 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-3(a)).
198. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005).
199. Flores, 521 U.S. at 516-35 (finding that Congress was, in effect, altering the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore, not merely enforcing the
Clause). For a discussion of the unconstitutionality of RFRA, see Marci A. Ham-
ilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1 (1998).
200. Even so, the legislative history of RFRA suggests that courts were to apply RFRA
to prison inmate claims. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993). For a discussion of
RFRA's effects on free exercise in prisons, see generally Daniel J. Solove, Note,
Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Pris-
ons, 106 YALE L.J. 459 (1996). For a discussion of the effects of Boerne on prison-
ers' free exercise, see generally, Maya Miyashita, City of Boerne v. Flores and its
Impact on Prisoners' Religious Freedom, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CiV. CONFINE-
MENT 519 (1999).
201. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
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ing applicability, which was very similar to RFRA.202 Rebuffed by the
Court when using the Section Five power, Congress intended to legis-
late to the full extent of its powers under the Spending Clause20 3 and
the Commerce Clause. 20 4 Essentially, the "Religious Liberty Protec-
tion Act," as it was called, prohibited government programs that re-
ceived federal funds or government actions affecting interstate
commerce from substantially burdening a person's religious exercise
unless the application of that burden was the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 20 5 The broad lan-
guage in this early House version raised concerns that individuals or
corporations would be able to use their professed religious faith to ex-
empt themselves from State and local anti-discrimination laws.206 Al-
though this Act passed in the House, 20 7 it never came to a vote in the
Senate.
Ultimately, a Senate version of narrower applicability passed both
houses of Congress as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").208 The substantive provisions of
RLUIPA are the same as those of RFRA. However, the applicability of
RLUIPA is far less sweeping than RFRA would have been. 20 9 As the
title suggests, RLUIPA applies to two areas: Section 2 is directed at
land use regulations;210 and Section 3 concerns persons residing in or
confined to an institution.21 1 RLUIPA's standard prohibits the gov-
ernment from imposing a "substantial burden" on the religious exer-
cise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in-
202. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999);
H.R.Rep. No. 106-219 (1999).
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Act would have applied to "a program or activ-
ity, operated by a government, that receives Federal financial assistance," Relig-
ious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1999).
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Act would have applied "in any case in which the
substantial burden on the person's religious exercise affects, or in which a re-
moval of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes," Religious Liberty Protection Act
of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (1999).
205. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a), (b)
(1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-219 (1999).
206. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. H5580, H5584-608 (statements of, inter alia, Reps.
Conyers, Deutsch, Frank, Jackson-Lee, Maloney, Nadler, Wexler).
207. 145 CONG. REC. H5580, at H5608.
208. S. 2869, 106th Cong. (1999) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-cc-5 (2000)).
209. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
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terest. 21 2 Section 3 was enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under
the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause2 1 3 and "applies in any
case in which (1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or
activity that receives Federal financial assistance; or (2) the substan-
tial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with In-
dian tribes."2 14
It is likely that the Senate version was limited in scope in order to
allay the fears of those people and organizations who believed that an
act of sweeping applicability would have adverse effects on other civil
rights laws.2 15 The Joint Statement of Senator Hatch and Senator
Kennedy ("Joint Statement") enumerated reasons for the legislation
as it pertains to both land use regulations and institutionalized per-
sons. 2 16 Concerning prison inmates, the Joint Statement pointed to a
number of post-Boerne free exercise cases that the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary felt had been decided incorrectly against the in-
mate. 2 17 The Joint Statement reflected the view that the "compelling
interest" test best met the needs of prison inmates. 2 18 It also under-
scored the congressional authority to enact such legislation, noting
that "[clongressional power to attach germane conditions to federal
spending has long been upheld"2 19 and that action under the Com-
merce Clause required proof of a "jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the burden on [the religious
exercise in question] affects interstate commerce." 22 0
The threshold issue in either a RFRA or RLUIPA inquiry is
whether the prison facility has imposed a "substantial burden" on the
religious exercise of the claimant-inmate.221 RFRA defines religious
exercise as "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
213. Id. § 2000cc-l(b); see also 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (Joint Statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). For a discussion of Congress's use of its Spending
Clause and Commerce Clause powers enacting RLUIPA, see generally, Derek L.
Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of
RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'T. 501 (2005).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b). See also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715-16, 716 n.4 (noting that
every state receives federal funds for its prisons).
215. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (Joint Statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ken-
nedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
216. Id.
217. 146 CONG. REC. at S7775; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716 n.5.
218. 146 CONG. REC. at S7775.
219. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937)).
220. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a) and 2000cc-l(a) (2000). For a thorough discussion of
what may constitute a "substantial burden," see Christine M. Peluso, Note, Con-
gressional Intent v. Judicial Reality: The Practical Effects of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 6 RUTGERS J. LAW & REL. 5 (2004).
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Constitution."22 2 RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" more broadly
than RFRA, to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."223 By changing
the definition of religious exercise and adding that RLUIPA "shall be
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,"2 24 Con-
gress suggested that a wider scope of infringements would violate in-
mates' free exercise rights. 2 25 One district court has determined that
"state action substantially burdens the exercise of religion within the
meaning of the RLUIPA when it prevents a religious adherent from
engaging in conduct both important to the adherent and motivated by
sincere religious belief."22 6 If the inmate has shown that a prison reg-
ulation substantially burdens his free exercise of religion, the court
would then conduct the "compelling interest" test.
4. The Petitioners' Claim in Cutter
The petitioner-inmates in Cutter were current and former inmates
of prison institutions maintained by the Ohio Department of Rehabili-
tation and Correction. 22 7 They claimed to be adherents of "nonmain-
stream" religions.2 28 Initially, petitioners filed suit under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, asserting that the respondents had
failed to accommodate their religious exercise. 2 29 After enactment of
RLUIPA, petitioners amended their complaints to include claims
222. Id. § 2000bb-2(4). The RFRA definition had spawned three main interpretations
of the threshold "substantial burden" inquiry: the compulsion test, see Coronel v.
Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 876 (D. Ariz. 2004) (citing Goodall v. Stafford County
Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995)), the centrality test, see id. (citing
Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1995)), and
the religious motivation test, see id. at 876-77 (citing Rouser v. White, 944 F.
Supp. 1447, 1455 (E.D. Cal. 1996)). The compulsion test and centrality test were
quite similar. They respectively limited RFRA to practices that were mandated
or compelled by the inmates' religion, see, e.g., Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 769, 783
(S.D. Iowa 1995), or required the inmate to show that the burdened practice in-
terfered with a central tenet of their religion's doctrine. See, e.g., Abdur-
Rahman, 65 F.3d at 491-92. The other approach, the religious motivation test,
was much broader: inmates only need to demonstrate that the prison officials
prevented them from engaging in conduct that was both important to them and
motivated by sincere religious belief. See, e.g., Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp.
215, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2000).
225. See Coronel v. Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 879 (D. Ariz. 2004) (citing Elsinore
Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2003))
(believing that the new definition intended to do away with the compulsion and
centrality tests). See also 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000).
226. Coronel, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
227. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).
228. Id. These non-mainstream religions include Satanism, Wicca, Asatru, and the
Church of Jesus Christ Christian. Id.
229. Id. at 712, 717.
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under Section Three. 23 0 Respondents moved to dismiss the RLUIPA
claims, arguing that Section Three violated the Establishment
Clause. 231 The district court rejected this argument.2
32
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, finding that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause by
impermissibly advancing religion by giving greater protection to relig-
ious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights, without any
showing that religious rights are at any greater risk of deprivation. 2 33
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by noting that Justice Stevens,
concurring in City of Boerne v. Flores, concluded that the RLUIPA's
predecessor, RFRA, violated the Establishment Clause:
[Tihe RFRA is a law "respecting an establishment of religion" that violates the
First Amendment to the Constitution .... [T]he statute has provided the
[religious organizations] with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can
obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is
forbidden by the First Amendment.
2 3 4
The court strongly suggested that RLUIPA's purpose was to advance
religion in prisons relative to other constitutionally protected conduct,
in which case Congress had abandoned neutrality and acted with the
purpose of furthering religion. 23 5 Because RLUIPA grants a great re-
versal of fortune for the religious rights of inmates, as opposed to
other constitutional rights, it advanced religion by giving religious
prisoners a preferred status in the prison community. 23 6 In addition
to RLUIPA's message of endorsement, the Sixth Circuit found that the
Act also has the effect of encouraging prisoners to become religious in
order to enjoy greater rights. 23 7
In Madison v. Riter,2 38 Charles v. Verhagen,23 9 and Mayweathers
v. Newland,240 the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, respectively, determined that RLUIPA as applied to prison in-
mates did not violate the Establishment Clause. Furthermore, five
circuits, including the Seventh and Ninth, previously had concluded
that the same substantive language in RFRA did not violate the Es-
230. Id. at 717.
231. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
232. Id. at 846-49.
233. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 709
(2005).
234. Id. at 261 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (internal citations omitted)).
235. Id. at 264.
236. Id. at 264-67.
237. Id. at 266 (citing Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion
of Brennan, J.) (allowing a statute's effect on nonreligious persons to be part of
the analysis)).
238. 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
239. 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
240. 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
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tablishment Clause. 24i To resolve this split in the Circuits, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Cutter.242 Each of the Courts of
Appeals evaluating RLUIPA's validity under the Establishment
Clause applied some form of the 3-prong test from Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.2 4 3 The Supreme Court, though, "resolve[d Cutter] on other
grounds."2 44
5. Cutter's Reasoning
The Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, holding that
Section Three of RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. 24 5 The First Amendment provides in part,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."24 6 The Establishment
Clause, the Court stated, calls for a separation of church and state.
24 7
The Free Exercise Clause, on the other hand, requires that the gov-
ernment respect the religious beliefs and practices of the citizenry. 248
241. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998); Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104
F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1997); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir.
1996), vacated on other grounds, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of
Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352,
1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
242. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 543 U.S. 924 (2004). The Second Circuit, while not address-
ing the constitutionality of RLUIPA, recognized that the statute might "present
complex legal issues." McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2004)
(comparing Cutter, 349 F.3d 257, with Madison, 355 F.3d 310).
243. Madison, 355 F.3d at 315-20; Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-68; Charles, 348 F.3d at
610-11; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068-69. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court articulated a three-pronged inquiry based on
earlier precedent, stating that government action does not run afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause if (1) the action has a secular purpose; (2) its principal or pri-
mary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13 (internal cita-
tions omitted). Though never formally repudiated by the Court, the Lemon test
has been much maligned. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Agnilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). In the words of Justice Scalia, the Lemon test is like a
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried .... When
we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it ... when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely .... Such a
docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somno-
lent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
244. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.6 (2005).
245. Id. at 720.
246. Id. at 719 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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Although the two clauses exude complementary values, they fre-
quently champion contrary ideals.2 4 9 However, the Court has contin-
ually recognized "that there is room for play in the joints" between the
clauses. 25
0
The Court found that Section Three of RLUIPA did not offend the
Establishment Clause because it permissibly alleviates excessive gov-
ernment-created burdens on private free exercise. 2 5 1 Properly ap-
plied, RLUIPA would still require courts to consider the burdens a
requested accommodation would have on nonbeneficiaries. 2 52 At the
same time, courts must ensure that any benefits from RLUIPA are
administered neutrally among different faiths; the statute confers no
special status on any particular religious sect or faith.253 The Court
also indicated that RLUIPA should be applied in "an appropriately
balanced way:" it does not require prison institutions to elevate the
need to accommodate religious exercise over the competing need to
maintain order and safety.2 54 Although "the Act adopts a 'compelling
governmental interest standard [of review], 'context matters' in the
application of that standard."25 5 Moreover, the Court pointed out that
the Joint Statement had anticipated that courts would apply the Act's
standard with "due deference to the experience and expertise of prison
and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and pro-
cedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent
with consideration of costs and limited resources."256
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Circuit had "mis-
read [the] precedents to require invalidation of RLUIPA."257 The
249. Id. (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City
of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
250. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 669). For a discussion which
includes a look at the tension between the Religion Clauses, including an exami-
nation of the land-use provisions of RLUIPA, see Richard C. Schragger, The Role
of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1810 (2004).
251. Id. at 720 (citing Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 705 (1994)) (other citations omitted).
252. Id. (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). Accommoda-
tion refers to government action that removes a burden on, or facilitates the exer-
cise of, a person's free exercise of religion. See Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 685, 686 (1992).
253. Id. at 720, 724-25 (citing Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 690, 706) (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 722-23.
255. Id. at 723 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
256. Id. at 723 (citing 146 CONG. REc. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy)). Although the Joint Statement claims that there should be defer-
ence granted to the judgment of prison administrators, RLUIPA imposes the
compelling interest test which effectively removes a court's deference to those
officials.
257. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir.
2003)). For support of the view that the Sixth Circuit ruled erroneously, see
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Court pointed out that in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, it had held that religious
accommodations need not "come packaged with benefits to secular en-
tities."2 58 Otherwise, the Court reasoned, "all manner of religious ac-
commodations would fall."25 9 The Court emphasized that the
petitioners had made a facial challenge to Section Three and that none
of them had contended that under the facts of any particular case,
application of RLUIPA had resulted in an unconstitutional out-
come.2 60 Thus, inmate constitutional claims should be evaluated us-
ing strict scrutiny.
C. Turner Reapplied: Beard v. Banks
The year after Johnson and Cutter, the Supreme Court was
presented with yet another prisoner rights case. In Beard v. Banks,
the Court was asked to "consider whether a Pennsylvania prison pol-
icy that denie[d] newspapers, magazines, and photographs to a group
of specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates violate[d] the First
Amendment."26 1 The case arose on a motion for summary judg-
ment.26 2 The Court determined, based on the record already devel-
oped, that prison officials had established valid legal support for the
policy and that the plaintiff had failed to set forth specific facts that
would warrant a determination in his favor.
2 63
The regulation at issue applied to inmates in Pennsylvania's Long
Term Segregation Unit ("LTSU"), the most restrictive unit for Penn-
sylvania's "most incorrigible, recalcitrant inmates."264 The LTSU is
divided into two levels. Inmates in the more restrictive level 2 have no
access to the commissary, may only have one visitor per month, and
are not allowed phone calls except in emergencies. 26 5 The regulation
at issue in Beard prohibited a level 2 LTSU inmate from having access
to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs. 26 6 Such an in-
mate may, however, receive "legal and personal correspondence, relig-
ious and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper."26 7 An
James B. McMullin, Note and Comment, Incarceration of the Free Exercise
Clause: The Sixth Circuit's Misstep in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L.
413 (2005).
258. Id. (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)) (other citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 725 (citing Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Ohio
2002)).
261. 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2575 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 2576.
264. Id. (quoted language from App. at 25).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 2577.
267. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2576.
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inmate at level 1 still may not have photographs, but may receive one
newspaper and five magazines. 268
In 2001, the plaintiff-respondent, an LTSU level 2 inmate, filed
suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of
the Department of Corrections, claiming that the policy forbidding
level 2 inmates access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs vi-
olated the First Amendment. 26 9 The district court certified a class
composed of similarly situated level 2 inmates, and a magistrate judge
conducted discovery.270 The Secretary filed a motion for summary
judgment which was accompanied by a statement of undisputed facts,
and the inmates failed to challenge any of the facts put forth the Sec-
retary. 2 71 The district court granted the Secretary's motion, but a di-
vided Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. 27 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 2 73
The plurality opinion began its analysis by recognizing that the le-
gal standards from Turner v. Safley and Overton v. Bazzetta would
govern the case. 2 74 Noting the principle that the Constitution permits
greater restrictions on those who are imprisoned than on those who
are not, the plurality reiterated Turner's rule that prison regulations
are permissible if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penologi-
cal interests." 27 5 Next, the opinion outlined the four factors.
2 76
Though the Secretary offered three penological rationales for the
LTSU policy, the first, which was to motivate better behavior on the
part of the most difficult prisoners, alone was deemed adequate. 2 7
7
The plurality began with the first Turner factor, accepting the valid
rational connection offered by the Secretary; that is, that the depriva-
tion of the inmate's last privilege (newspapers, magazines, and photo-
graphs) offered a significant incentive to improve behavior. 2
78
Though the plurality opinion briefly looked at the second, third, and
fourth factors, it noted that those factors "here add little, one way or
another, to the first factor's basic logical rationale."279 Because of
these factors' limited assistance in the case, the plurality stated that
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2577.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2005)).
273. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2577 (citing Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005)).
274. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126
(2003)).
275. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 87) (internal quotations omitted).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2579.
279. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2580. The plurality also noted, in citations, that Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion and Justice Thomas' concurring opinion recognized
this difficulty with the Turner factors in this case. Id.
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"[t]he real task in this case is not balancing these factors, but rather
determining whether the Secretary shows more than simply a logical
relation, that is, whether he shows a reasonable relation."280 Based
on the material presented, the prison officials demonstrated that the
policy was reasonable. 28 1 The opinion also compared the case to Over-
ton, where a prison had restricted family visitations for inmates with
repeat substance abuse problems. In both cases, the prison officials,
relying on experience and professional judgment, imposed a depriva-
tion-meant to induce compliance with appropriate inmate behav-
ior-"only upon those with serious prison-behavior problems . *..."282
IV. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF JOHNSON,
CUTTER & BEARD: UNCERTAINTY
There are several consequences of the 2005 cases, Johnson and
Cutter. The most obvious results flow from each case's central issue
and holding. Unlike the claims outlined in Part II, inmate equal pro-
tection claims based on racial classifications are subject to the compel-
ling interest test rather than Turner.28 3 Second, Congress' enactment
of RLUIPA basically abrogates the Supreme Court's decision concern-
ing inmate free exercise in O'Lone and requires the evaluation of those
claims to use the compelling interest test. 284 In Cutter, the Court
found that this was constitutionally permissible. In Johnson v. Cali-
fornia, despite 18 years of unequivocal use of the reasonableness test,
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2580. Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered
an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter
joined. Id. at 2575.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justice Thomas echoed many of the same ideas from his concurrence
in Overton v. Bazzetta, see supra note 128. He also discussed the shortcomings of
the Turner analysis in dealing with a deprivation case. Id. at 2582-85.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion. Using
Turner analysis, Justice Stevens did not believe that the Secretary had estab-
lished that the challenged regulation was reasonably related to legitimate inter-
ests nor that the Secretary should have been awarded summary judgment. Id. at
2585-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, criticizing the plurality's analysis
of summary judgment. Id. at 2591-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
282. Id. at 2580 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003)).
283. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005). A prison must demonstrate that
a racial classification is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Id.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000). The government is prohibited from imposing a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of an inmate, even if the burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden: "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest." Id.
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the Court broke with this line of prisoner rights cases. The fallout
from the 2005 decisions is that the level of constitutional protection
afforded to prisoners, which was uniform in 2003, is now uncertain.
Section A will discuss the Court's departure and the consequences of
this exception on future inmate claims. Section B will explore Con-
gress' willingness to use its Spending (and Commerce) powers to repu-
diate the Supreme Court's delineated level of scrutiny for
constitutional claims of inmates. The net combined effect is that Tur-
ner's unitary standard has been undermined.
A. Categorical Application of the Reasonableness Test
Undermined by Johnson
As noted in Part II, the pre-2005 prisoner rights jurisprudence re-
flected the view that Turner applied to all constitutional claims
brought by prisoners. This principle was articulated by the Court nu-
merous times. In Turner, the Court stated that the articulation of the
"reasonableness" test fulfilled the Court's task "to formulate a stan-
dard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive
both to the policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints
and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights."28 5 Turner itself ap-
plied the test to both a First Amendment claim and a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim. Three years later, in
Washington v. Harper, the Court explicitly stated that "the standard
of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which
the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights."
28 6
A unanimous Court in Shaw v. Murphy noted that in Turner, it had
"adopted a unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners' con-
stitutional claims."28 7 Though the constitutional claims in all of the
pre-2005 cases had invoked only First Amendment or Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, the Court's pronouncements were
unequivocal.
On the other hand, the Court has also held that all racial classifica-
tions imposed by the government must be analyzed using strict scru-
tiny.2SS Involving the use of racial classifications in prison, Johnson
therefore stood at the intersection of two lines of cases: racial-classifi-
cation cases, which require strict scrutiny; and other inmate constitu-
tional cases, which prescribe the Turner test. Both sets of cases
unequivocally demanded their respective standard of review. The
Court chose to resolve this tension in favor of strict scrutiny for gov-
ernmental use of a racial classification in prison. In fact, the Court
quickly dismissed Turner, characterizing the CDC's proposed use of
285. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
286. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 85).
287. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
288. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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the reasonableness test as "an exception to the rule that strict scru-
tiny applies to all racial classifications" 28 9 rather than depicting John-
son as an exception to the inmate cases.
29 0
The Court suggested that applying strict scrutiny in Johnson is not
an exception to Turner.2 9 1 Citing Lee v. Washington,29 2 the Court
claimed that it previously had "applied a heightened standard of re-
view in evaluating racial segregation in prisons."293 However, this as-
sertion is untrue. In Lee, the Court upheld a three-judge district court
decision that "certain Alabama statutes violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the extent that they require segregation of the races in
prisons and jails."294 The district court had found that "complete and
permanent segregation" in prisons could not be justified in the inter-
ests of prison security.295 The Court's single paragraph per curiam
affirmance never articulated a standard of review; it merely found the
district court's desegregation order "unexceptional."29 6 Moreover,
three Justices concurred:
[T]o make explicit something that is left to be gathered only by implication
from the Court's opinion. This is that prison authorities have the right, acting
in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial
289. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005).
290. Justice Thomas, dissenting in Johnson, noted the tension between the two lines
of cases. He began his opinion by stating that "[t]he questions presented in this
case require us to resolve two conflicting lines of precedent." Id. at 524 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' opinion offers a fuller discussion of the Court's
prior use of Turner than did the Court's opinion. See id. at 529-32 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
291. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506-14.
292. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
293. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506-07.
294. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
295. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331-32 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
296. The entire per curiam opinion reads:
This appeal challenges a decree of a three-judge District Court declaring
that certain Alabama statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
extent that they require segregation of the races in prisons and jails, and
establishing a schedule for desegregation of these institutions. The
State's contentions that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which relates to class actions, was violated in this case and that the chal-
lenged statutes are not unconstitutional are without merit. The remain-
ing contention of the State is that the specific orders directing
desegregation of prisons and jails make no allowance for the necessities
of prison security and discipline, but we do not so read the 'Order, Judg-
ment and Decree' of the District Court, which when read as a whole we
find unexceptionable. The judgment is affirmed.
Lee, 390 U.S. at 333-34.
See also Johnson, 543 U.S. at 540 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
"Lee said nothing about the applicable standard of review, for there was no
need."); Brandon N. Robinson, Note, Johnson v. California: A Grayer Shade of
Brown, 56 DUKE L.J. 343, 363 (2006).
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tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and
jails.
2 9 7
Thus, the Johnson Court disingenuously characterized Lee as calling
for strict scrutiny.2 98 Lee was not a pre-carved exception to Turner,
and the case should not have been interpreted as precedent for the
application of strict scrutiny in the prison context. Instead, the Tur-
ner test should have been understood as the "unitary, deferential stan-
dard" that the prisoner rights cases called for.
2 99
The once-clear unitary standard of review for inmate constitu-
tional claims is now cloudy. In recapitulation, the Court previously
had applied Turner's reasonableness test to a number of specific con-
stitutional rights, including inmate-to-inmate correspondence (First
Amendment) and inmate marriage (Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess),3 00 free exercise (First Amendment),3 0 1 receipt of publications
(First Amendment),302 rejection of treatment by antipsychotic drugs
(Fourteenth Amendment due process), 30 3 provision of legal assistance
to other inmates (First Amendment),304 and receipt of visitors (First
Amendment). 3 05 The Court also recognized that Turner required def-
erence to prison officials when evaluating an inmate's claim based on
right of access to the courts. 3 06 In 2006, a plurality of the Court re-
turned to the Turner inquiry for a claim concerning retention of publi-
cations and other printed materials (First Amendment).3 0 7 Rounding
out the current scorecard, RLUIPA and Cutter remove free exercise
claims (First Amendment) from evaluation under the reasonableness
test, in favor of the compelling interest test (and will be discussed be-
low, in Section B), and Johnson mandates that race-based equal pro-
tection claims (Fourteenth Amendment) also use the compelling
interest test.
297. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart, concurring).
298. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 539-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Robinson,
supra note 291, at 364 ("[Ilt is not clear that [the comments in the concurrence],
absent any mention of a standard of review, translate into the application of
strict scrutiny.").
299. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987)). Justice Thomas, dissenting in Johnson, summed it up: "If Turner is
our accommodation of the Constitution's demands to those of prison administra-
tion, we should apply it uniformly to prisoners' challenges to their conditions of
confinement." Johnson, 543 U.S. at 531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation
omitted).
300. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
301. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
302. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
303. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
304. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
305. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
306. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
307. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
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Johnson's departure from the reasonableness test corrodes the
Turner-line cases' unequivocal language, without offering appropriate
guidance for when such a departure is warranted. As noted above, Lee
v. Washington was not proper precedent for such a decision. Cer-
tainly, the right at stake in Johnson is different from those which pre-
viously had been evaluated by the reasonableness test. The other
cases involved fundamental rights under the First Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, whereas Johnson's
claim involved a suspect classification under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Johnson Court offered the
nebulous justification that Turner had been applied "only to rights
that are inconsistent with proper incarceration."308 The logic of this
claim, however, vastly overreaches. Using this rationale, any right
"consistent with incarceration" would fall outside of Turner's realm,
repudiating the idea of a unitary standard for all constitutional
claims. Although the right to freedom of association in intimate rela-
tionships3O9 may not be consistent with incarceration, the Johnson
Court seemed to re-classify some rights, such as the right to marry in
Turner itself,310 and the right to correspond with fellow inmates con-
cerning legal assistance.311 Surely these rights are consistent with
incarceration. Notably, the Court did not cite O'Lone for this proposi-
tion. Free exercise of religion cannot be deemed to be "inconsistent"
with incarceration. Thus, the premise that Turner is reserved only for
those rights that are inconsistent with incarceration is a faulty one.
The Court also relied on the importance of the policies behind ele-
vating scrutiny for racial classifications, specifically that such govern-
mental classifications "raise special fears that they are motivated by
an invidious purpose."3 12 Generally, the Court does not impose
heightened scrutiny arbitrarily. Rather, the Court offers potent rea-
sons when it elevates scrutiny-whether for governmental use of sus-
pect classifications, or the infringement of fundamental rights.313
Because heightened scrutiny is always justified by powerful rationale,
it is impossible to determine which right infringed, or suspect classifi-
cation used, would not follow the Turner-line's pattern of judging in-
mate claims under a less restrictive test than normally applied
308. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (internal citation omitted).
309. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 131.
310. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987). In Turner, the Court inquired
whether the alleged right to marriage survived incarceration at all, and found
that it did. Id. at 95-96.
311. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
312. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
313. For example, when the government interferes with the fundamental right to the
"sanctity of the family," strict scrutiny is used "precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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outside the prison context.3 14 The tortured history of racial classifica-
tions in this country underscores the need for equal protection of the
law; however, the rights to which the Court previously has applied
Turner-including those enshrined in the First Amendment-are no
less central to the fabric of America, as are other fundamental rights
which have not yet been evaluated by the Court in the prison context.
The reasons to protect these rights, including those rights that are
"consistent" with incarceration, are as salient as those offered to en-
sure equal protection of the law. However, all these reasons must be
balanced with the needs of running a proper corrections facility.
Thus, there is no clear reason why racial classifications were singled
out to be excepted from Turner's reasonableness test, where all other
constitutional rights follow the Turner standard.
The exception in Johnson creates uncertainty as to the level of
scrutiny for inmate constitutional claims. The Court's opinion offered
little guidance to the courts of appeals and district courts when they
evaluate new constitutional claims. Prior to 2005, the lower courts
knew that Turner inquiry should be used for all constitutional claims.
This mandate was so clear that the Ninth Circuit in Johnson applied
the Turner reasonableness test and found that the CDC policy sur-
vived the deferential standard.315 However, based on the shaky dis-
tinctions offered by Johnson for elevating scrutiny beyond Turner, it
now appears that any claim not yet evaluated by the Court could be
the next exception to the use of the Turner inquiry. Potentially, in-
mate-plaintiffs will eagerly file claims seeking to establish the next
right to be evaluated using strict scrutiny. Moreover, the rationale
used by the Johnson Court to apply strict scrutiny would suggest that
several of the Court's prior inmate-rights cases should be reconsid-
ered. Any right or classification which ordinarily uses heightened
scrutiny outside the prison context-and is not considered "inconsis-
tent" with incarceration-could be the newest exception to Turner.
B. Congressional Prerogative to Alter Scrutiny for Inmate
Claims
Congress has decided to determine the level of protection that
should be granted to prison inmates' free exercise rights. Enacted
314. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Jones v. North Caro-
lina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977).
Ironically, RLUIPA-and the Court's approval of RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkin-
son, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)-actually raised scrutiny for free exercise claims well
beyond what had been mandated by the Court in O'Lone. A discussion of
RLUIPA, and the Congressional means for altering the standard of review, will
be discussed below, in section IV.B infra.
315. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 807 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499
(2005).
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pursuant to Congress' powers under the Spending and Commerce
Clauses, Section 3 of RLUIPA forbids the government from imposing a
substantial burden on an inmate's free exercise. 3 16 The Joint State-
ment pointed to the congressional authority to enact such legislation,
noting that "[c]ongressional power to attach germane conditions to
federal spending has long been upheld"3 17 and that action under the
Commerce Clause required proof of a "'jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [burden on relig-
ious exercise] in question affects interstate commerce."' 3 18 The
Court's decision in Cutter determined that RLUIPA did not violate the
Establishment Clause, 3 19 but did not reach any issue concerning Con-
gress' authority to enact the statute. Notably, though, the Court in-
cluded in a footnote that "[elvery State ... accepts federal funding for
its prisons."3 20
The current standards governing Congress' spending power clearly
permit Congress to legislate in this way. The Spending Clause grants
Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States."3 2 1 When using this power,
Congress "may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds."3 22
This power is broad, permitting Congress to pursue objectives not lim-
ited to Article I's "enumerated legislative fields."323 The primary
spending power case, South Dakota v. Dole, outlined four limitations
to the federal spending power.3 24 First, the spending must be in pur-
suit of "the general welfare."3 25 Second, where Congress attaches con-
ditions to its expenditure, such conditions must be stated
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b) (2000). RLUIPA "applies in any case in which (1) the sub-
stantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal finan-
cial assistance; or (2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the sev-
eral States, or with Indian tribes." Id. See also 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed.
June 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that a government action which
substantially burdens religious practice under RLUIPA must serve a compelling
interest).
317. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (joint Statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Stewart
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)).
318. Id. at S7774 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
319. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714-15 (2005).
320. Id. at 716 n.4.
321. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
322. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
323. Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
324. Id. at 207-08. Dole held that Congress may require the States to raise their legal
drinking ages to 21 in order to receive federal highway funds. Id. at 211-12.
325. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
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unambiguously.326 Third, the federal spending should be related "to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs."327
Finally, the conditioning of spending may not violate any other consti-
tutional provision.32s
Though the Supreme Court has not passed on the constitutionality
of Congress' use of its spending power to enact RLUIPA, several
courts of appeals have done so. In Cutter, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case back to Sixth Circuit, 32 9 and the court of appeals
evaluated Ohio's Spending Clause challenges.3 30 Two of the courts of
appeals that had previously determined that RLUIPA did not violate
the Establishment Clause-the Seventh Circuit in Charles v.
Verhagen3 31 and the Ninth Circuit in Mayweathers v. Newland
33 2-
did so as part of their Spending Clause analyses. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in Benning v. Georgia, also weighed in on the Spending Clause
issue (including an analysis of the Establishment Clause).3 33 All four
courts agreed that RLUIPA is a legitimate use of Congress' spending
power.33 4
A summary discussion of how RLUIPA is a permissible use of Con-
gress' spending power follows here, based on the rationale offered by
the courts of appeals. First, Dole instructs that courts should "defer
substantially" to Congress when determining if a statute-to wit,
RLUIPA-is in pursuit of the general welfare.3 35 In fact, because of
the great deference granted to Congress' judgment, the Court has
questioned "whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable re-
striction at all."336 The protection of religious worship, a constitu-
tional value, from substantial burdens in prisons promotes the general
326. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
327. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)). Dole states that conditions "might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs." Id.
at 207 (internal quotations omitted).
328. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469
U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)) (other citations omitted).
329. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 (2005).
330. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that "RLUIPA fits
comfortably within each of the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court in
Dole. We therefore hold that the Act is a permissible exercise of Congress's
Spending Clause powers."). Id. at 590.
331. 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
332. 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
333. 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004).
334. For further evaluation of Congress' authority to enact RLUIPA under the Spend-
ing Clause, see Gaubatz, supra note 213, at 590-98; Benjamin D. Cramer, Com-
ment, Can Congress Buy RLUIPA's Way to Constitutional Salvation?, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1073, 1083-91 (2005).
335. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations omitted).
336. Id. at 207 n.2.
319
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welfare. 3 37 RLUIPA is designed "to guard against unfair bias and in-
fringement on fundamental freedoms," 338 as well as "to promote the
rehabilitation of prisoners."3 39 Given Dole's deference to the judg-
ment of Congress, the three goals of (1) protecting respected constitu-
tional rights, (2) guarding against bias, and (3) promoting
rehabilitation surely satisfy the requirement that RLUIPA must pro-
mote the general welfare.
RLUIPA must also unambiguously state the conditions for the re-
ceipt of federal funds, so that the States may make an informed deci-
sion about whether to receive those funds.3 40 The Act explicitly
applies to any "program or activity that receives Federal financial as-
sistance."3 4 1 This clear language expressly imposes RLUIPA as a con-
dition for federal funding. It may be argued that the "least restrictive
alternative" test in RLUIPA makes the specific conditions for funding
ambiguous.3 42 However, the conditions may be "largely indetermi-
nate," so long as the legislation provides the States "clear notice" that
they must comply with condition. 3 43 Congress need not spell out
every possible instance in which a State may fail to comply with the
conditions. 34 4 Thus, the plain language in RLUIPA unambiguously
conditions federal funding on the requirement that institutions receiv-
ing funds may not impose a substantial burden on any inmate's relig-
ious exercise, unless that burden is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling governmental interest.
Dole's third limitation states that prior cases "have suggested
(without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs."3 45 The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that this language is "nonconclusive" and that an attack
on the spending power using this basis still may not invalidate the
statute.3 46 Dole suggested that conditions that are "reasonably calcu-
337. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that "rehabilitation of pris-
oners falls squarely within Congress' pursuit of the general welfare under its
Spending Clause authority."). Id.
338. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067 (2002) (citations omitted).
339. Charles, 348 F.3d at 607.
340. Dole, 482 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(1) (2000).
342. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Geor-
gia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2004); Charles, 348 F.3d at 607-08.
343. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981).
344. See supra note 342.
345. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
346. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067; see also Cutter, 423 F.3d at 586 (noting that the
inquiry used by the Supreme Court in Dole was not particularly strenuous); Ben-
ning, 391 F.3d at 1308 (referring to the Dole Court's application as a "minimal
standard of rationality").
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lated to address" the federal interest are acceptable. 3 47 Despite the
seemingly non-mandatory nature of this limitation, RLUIPA's condi-
tions, nonetheless, adequately relate to federal spending. Congress
has an interest in allocating funds to institutions that respect the
rights of prison inmates, and in promoting their rehabilitation.
3 48
Even if federal funds are not specifically spent on religious programs,
an institution's compliance with RLUIPA still satisfies one of the Act's
primary purposes: greater religious freedom for inmates in order to
further their rehabilitation.3 49 Thus, the conditions imposed by
RLUIPA are related to federal interests.
Finally, Dole mandates that RLUIPA may not violate any other
constitutional provision. 3 50 The most obvious constitutional challenge
to RLUIPA's constitutionality is that it violates the Establishment
Clause. The Supreme Court already has dispensed with that conten-
tion, holding that RLUIPA permissibly alleviates excessive govern-
ment-created burdens on private free exercise.35 1  Another
constitutional challenge to RLUIPA concerns Congress' power to regu-
late interstate commerce; however, whether the Commerce Clause
provides an independent justification for RLUIPA is irrelevant to its
constitutionality under the Spending Clause. 3
52
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states that
"[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people,"3 5 3 could provide basis for a challenge.
3 54 Im-
portantly, Dole observed that "a perceived Tenth Amendment
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomi-
tantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal
grants."35 5 In other words, even if Congress otherwise may not have
been authorized to pursue goals in a particular area, the Tenth
347. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (finding that Congress' requirement that States impose a
minimum drinking age of 21 was sufficiently related to the stated purpose of en-
suring safe interstate travel). Id. at 208-09.
348. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2005) (on remand from Cut-
ter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299,
1307-08 (11th Cir. 2004); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2003);
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
349. Cutter, 423 F.3d at 586-87; see also Charles, 348 F.3d at 609.
350. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
351. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citing Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994)) (other citation omitted).
352. See Charles, 348 F.3d at 609; see also Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068 n.2 (stating
that a determination of RLUIPA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause
is irrelevant because Congress had the authority to pass RLUIPA under its
spending power).
353. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
354. See Cutter, 423 F.3d at 588-90; Benning, 391 F.3d at 1308-09; Charles, 348 F.3d
at 609; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
355. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
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Amendment does not prevent Congress from attaching conditions to
federal funds that work to achieve those goals. 35 6 Moreover, RLUIPA
does not seek to regulate the operation of state prisons, a function that
is left to the States themselves; instead, it merely prohibits prison offi-
cials from imposing a substantial burden on religious rights.35 7 The
Tenth Amendment does not place restrictions on Congress' ability to
place conditions on federal spending, and RLUIPA does not usurp the
role of running prisons from the states. Under current jurisprudence,
the Act does not improperly intrude on the realm of the states.
358
Thus, there is no independent bar to the constitutionality of
RLUIPA.359
Governed by Dole, RLUIPA is clearly a constitutionally permissi-
ble use of Congress' spending power. The decisions from the courts of
appeals support this conclusion. Because of the obvious outcome
under Dole, it is unnecessary to analyze Congress' powers to regulate
interstate commerce. 360 It must be noted that Dole's four limitations
to the spending power provide scant oversight. The first limitation
may not be judicially enforceable, while the third may not be
mandatory. The fourth limitation adds nothing new to the constitu-
tional analysis, merely noting that Congress may not force States to
violate the Constitution. Obviously, the rest of the Constitution im-
poses this limitation as well. What remains is that Congress must
make the conditions on its spending unambiguous. Given South Da-
356. See id.; Cutter, 423 F.3d at 589-90; Charles, 348 F.3d at 609.
357. Cutter, 423 F.3d at 589-90; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
358. See Cutter, 423 F.3d at 588. For a discussion of RLUIPA's place within the feder-
alism debate, see Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True
Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND.
L.J. 311 (2003).
359. Because of the particular lack of merit to the argument, this Article will not ad-
dress the principle of separation of powers. This issue was dealt with succinctly
in Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070. Still, some scholarship suggests that by enact-
ing RLUIPA, Congress exceeded its authority. See Gregory S. Walston, Federal-
ism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional, 23 U. HAw. L. REV. 479 (2001).
360. See Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that because
RLUIPA was valid under the Spending Clause, the court did not need to involve
itself in arguments concerning the Commerce Clause); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423
F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2005) (on remand from Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005)) (holding the same as in Charles). See also Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d
1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Although both Benning and the United States argue
that Congress acted within its authority under both the Spending Clause and the
Commerce Clause, we need not address both arguments so long as Congress val-
idly exercised either source of authority."); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d
1062, 1068 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Having established that RLUIPA satisfies the
first three elements of the Dole test, we hold that Congress had the authority
under the spending power to pass this statute. Accordingly we need not decide
whether Congress also had the authority to pass RLUIPA under the Commerce
Clause.").
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kota v. Dole's limited check on the Congressional spending power, it is
not surprising that RLUIPA passes muster.3 6 1
RLUIPA's constitutionality is an exhibition of Congress' authority
to legislate a higher level of scrutiny for prisoners' rights. Given the
ease with which RLUIPA passes muster under Dole, an attempt by
Congress to create a higher level of scrutiny for any other inmate
rights through the spending power would pass muster. Dole's first-
but perhaps not judicially enforceable-limitation requires that the
federal spending must be in pursuit of "the general welfare."3 62 As
with RLUIPA, Congress simply would argue that the protection of an
inmate's constitutional right is in the general welfare. Further, the
boilerplate rationale that protecting prisoners' rights leads to their re-
habilitation surely survives Dole's deferential review of whether the
spending is for the general welfare. To withstand the second limita-
tion, Congress must unambiguously state the conditions for the fund-
ing.3 6 3 Obviously, this is entirely within Congress' ability to include
on any spending legislation. Third, and possibly not mandatory, the
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unre-
lated to the federal interest in particular national projects or pro-
grams."3 6 4 The rationale of tying the funds to rehabilitation would
satisfy this prong. Once again, an institution's compliance with a hy-
pothetical act would work toward Congress' rehabilitative goal
through a greater level of constitutional protection. Finally, the condi-
tioning of spending may not violate any other constitutional provi-
sion.36 5 The analysis of RLUIPA's constitutionality also demonstrates
that a hypothetical act would not run afoul of any other constitutional
provision. In fact, RLUIPA's effort to provide greater scrutiny to free
exercise rights must survive one more constitutional challenge than
would an effort directed toward any other right. Unlike the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, other constitutional provisions that guarantee individ-
ual rights are not accompanied by a constitutional counterweight-to
wit, the Establishment Clause-to the government's obligation to pro-
tect them.
Although RLUIPA's enactment did not change the level of constitu-
tional scrutiny to be used for inmate free exercise claims, it created a
statutory right that functionally abrogates O'Lone v. Estate of
361. Because the current Spending Clause jurisprudence is particularly permissive,
some commentators have suggested that this standard should be revisited. See
generally Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the
Court Should Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003); Cramer, supra note 329.
362. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations omitted).
363. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
364. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
365. Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256,
269-70 (1985) (other citations omitted)).
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Shabazz. Spending Clause jurisprudence indicates that Congress
would be free to take an interest in inmates' other rights as well. One
important practical lesson from analysis of RLUIPA is that the Court
apparently is not the final authority on inmate rights. Congress may
usurp that role through the use of its spending power. Further, from
Johnson v. California, the lesson to be gleaned is that the Court does
not bind itself to its own prisoner rights precedent. 3 66 Together,
Johnson and RLUIPA have cast a shadow over the once-uniform stan-
dard for evaluation of inmate constitutional claims. The lower courts
and prison administrators no longer have adequate guidance from the
Court, and they do not know when Congress may be willing to strike
next.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN JOHNSON V.
CALIFORNIA WAS WRONG
Although a majority of the Supreme Court, and probably many ob-
servers, believe that the compelling interest test is the appropriate
standard for inmates' claims that racial classifications are unconstitu-
tional, the reasons outlined in Turner for granting deferential review
to prison administrators, as well as the realities of the prison system,
belie the Court's decision.
36 7
A. The Need for Deference in Johnson
In Turner, where the Supreme Court established the deferential
standard for inmate constitutional claims, the Court recognized, as it
had in the past, that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increas-
ingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." 36s "Run-
ning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
366. Given the analysis just described, it might be noted that even if the Supreme
Court had determined that Johnson's claim should be evaluated under the in-
quiry from Turner, Congress would be able to establish by statute that inmate
claims concerning racial classifications should be evaluated using the compelling
interest test.
367. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 532 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the limited nature of the policy at issue and the need for deference to
California officials concerned with the lives and safety of the inmates, finding
that Turner provides the appropriate framework for this claim, and ultimately
concluding that the policy passes constitutional muster); see also Julie Taylor,
Note, Racial Segregation in California Prisons, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 139 (2003)
(discussing the adoption by the Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d
791 (9th Cir. 2003), of the Turner framework to analyze the constitutionality of
racial segregation policies in prisons).
368. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 405 (1974)); see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (finding that prison officials, rather than the courts, are in
the best position to make judgments concerning institutional operations).
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expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources ."369 The
Court further reasoned that
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking pro-
cess, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility
that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way
of solving the problem at hand.
3 7 0
These observations led to the uniform application of the Turner rea-
sonableness test as detailed in Parts II and IV, above.
The deference granted to corrections officials stems from what is
implied by the above reasoning: Prisons are fundamentally different
from free society. The confinement of individuals, many of whom were
convicted of violent felonies, within the walls of a single institution
creates a powder keg. That many prisons are rife with violence was
acknowledged by Turner, where the Court noted the existence of a
"growing problem with prison gangs."3 71 Moreover, racial violence is
at the forefront of troubles facing prison administration. 3 72 Simply
put, the realities of modern prisons require deference to the officials
charged with administering those institutions.
The specific situation faced by the CDC further supports the need
for deference. The CDC maintains that failure to separate new in-
mates by race in the reception areas would result in violence. Control-
ling prison gangs is the foremost problem facing prison administrators
and guards,3 7 3 and California is no exception. 3 74 California's prison
system was the birthplace of five major gangs located throughout the
nation: the Aryan Brotherhood, the Black Guerilla Family, the Mexi-
can Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, and the Texas Syndicate. 3 75 As these
names suggest, many prison gangs organize along racial or ethnic
369. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.
370. Id. at 89.
371. Id. at 91.
372. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 532 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dawson v. Delaware, 503
U.S. 159, 172-73 & n.1 (1992) (Thomas J., dissenting); Stefanow v. McFadden,
103 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Anyone familiar with prisons understands
the seriousness of the problems caused by prison gangs that are fueled by actively
virulent racism and religious bigotry.").
373. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 532 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Peter M. Carlson,
Prison Interventions: Evolving Strategies to Control Security Threat Groups, 5
CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. , Jan. 2001, at 10).
374. Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American
Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 Am. U. L. REV. 41, 56 n.69
(1987).
375. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 532. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Dennise Orlando-
Morningstar, Prison Gangs, SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDER BULL., Oct. 1997, at 4
(other citations omitted)); see also Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in
Supermax Prisons Based upon Alleged Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Pro-
cedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CAL.
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lines. Interracial murders and assaults perpetrated by these gangs
are not uncommon. 37 6 The influence of these gangs also can be seen
in the response to Governor Schwarzenegger's post-Johnson plan to
re-locate some inmates.3 7 7 Due to extreme overcrowding in the state's
prisons, the Governor sought volunteers for short-term relocation to
out-of-state prisons. Prison gangs, worried about losing numbers and
control, ordered inmates not to volunteer. This situation underscores
the need for deference to prison officials.
After determining that strict scrutiny-rather than Turner's rea-
sonableness test-would govern the claim in Johnson, the Court re-
manded the case for a determination on the merits. The Court
maintained that applying strict scrutiny "says nothing about the ulti-
mate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of
the court applying strict scrutiny."378 Still, the imposition of strict
scrutiny is nearly always fatal-in-fact. The Court hinted at its disap-
proval of the CDC policy, though, suggesting that it would only breed
further hostility among inmates. 37 9 Although prison security un-
doubtedly would satisfy the compelling interest requirement, the re-
quirement that the policy be narrowly-tailored is more troubling for
the CDC. Rather than wait for an adverse outcome in a lower court, in
December 2005, the California officials chose to settle.
Though no court actually analyzed the CDC policy using strict
scrutiny, Justice Stevens dissented in Johnson on the grounds that
"the Court should hold the policy unconstitutional on the current re-
cord."380 Justice Stevens found the professional opinions of the prison
officials unconvincing. The Court, he believed, "should instead insist
on hard evidence."38 1 He was troubled by the fact that "the CDC has
not cited a single specific incident of interracial violence between
cellmates," or shown that violence between cellmates played a role in
the broader institutional violence. 3 8 2 The danger with Justice Ste-
vens' assessment is that it seems to demand prison violence-perhaps
even an inmate's death-for such a policy to survive strict scrutiny.
L. REV. 1115, 1137-38 (1995) (discussing the procedural requirements for segre-
gating prisoners by gang affiliation).
376. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 532 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally Tachiki, supra
note 375, at 1126; Willens, supra note 374, at 55-56.
377. See Mark Martin, Relocation Plan isn't Attractive to Inmates; Gang Ties, Rumors
Undercut Proposal to Ease Crowding, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 2006, at Al.
378. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515 (majority opinion) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995)).
379. Id. at 509.
380. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens expressed the view that the
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause and would fail under either strict
scrutiny or the standard from Turner. Justice Stevens claimed that the CDC did
not offer evidence that would justify its policy. Id.
381. Id. at 519.
382. Id. at 520.
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Corrections administrators, then, are not permitted to prevent vio-
lence in the first instance, but may only react to acts of violence which
have already happened. Because the CDC policy concerned individual
cell assignments, there would have to be violence between cellmates in
order for the policy to be justified. This demands that the CDC offi-
cials play with fire in the powder keg. The reality of constitutional
standards of review, combined with the powerful influence of Justice
Stevens' dissent, effectively amounted to judicial disapproval of the
CDC policy.
In the time following the Court's decision in Johnson, corrections
institutions across California became embroiled in more racial vio-
lence. 38 3 On December 30, 2006, a major disturbance took place at the
California Institution for Men at Chino ("Chino").384 At the time,
Chino housed 6,396 inmates, and included a reception area for incom-
ing inmates from surrounding counties. Chino houses minimum and
medium level security inmates. A fight erupted between a black in-
mate and a Hispanic inmate in a recreation yard of the Reception
Center West Facility. As the fighting escalated, between 200 and 800
other inmates were involved. Although there were no fatalities, 27
inmates were sent to nearby hospitals for treatment, and another 24
inmates were treated at Chino. One inmate was stabbed and suffered
head wounds. Chino temporarily suspended the intake of new in-
mates while officials investigated the cause of this violence. The vio-
lence took place along racial lines, but did not appear to be the product
of gang activity. Notably, Chino had also been the site of several other
incidents of racial violence within the past year. This is a live example
of how racial tension and violence permeates California prisons and is
not limited to the influence of the gangs.
The Chino rioting took place after California had settled with
Johnson and agreed to a new cell assignment plan. However, it is not
clear if the rioting was an effect of the CDC's shift in policy. Either
way, had evidence of this recent violence been presented to a review-
383. See, e.g., Richard Winton & Sharon Bernstein, More Violence Erupts at Pitchess;
Black and Latino Inmates Clash at the North County Jail, leaving 13 Injured,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at B1. In the events reported in this article, over a
hundred inmates were involved, leaving a dozen inmates injured. This followed a
series of earlier instances of racial violence, including in areas for new inmates.
During riots which occurred a month earlier, over one hundred inmates were in-
jured, and there were two fatalities. It should be noticed that Pitchess is a county
jail and not administered by the California Department of Corrections. Id.
384. See Associated Press, Chino State Prison on Lockdown After Weekend Riot, Janu-
ary 1, 2007; Chakko Kuruvila, 27 Inmates Hurt in Prison Riot, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
31, 2006, at B2; Matthai Joe Mozingo, Chino Prison Remains Locked Down, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at B1; Press Release Lt. Mark Hargrove, Cal. Dep't of Corrs.
& Rehab., Major Prison Disturbance at the California Institution for Men in
Chino (Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Communciations/pres20061230.
html.
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ing court, would the plan have passed the narrow tailoring require-
ment of strict scrutiny? Justice Stevens faulted the CDC because it
had offered no evidence that prison gangs recruit new inmates into
committing racial violence during their 60 days in the reception cen-
ters and because the CDC did not identify any instances where new
inmates committed racial violence against other new inmates in the
common areas.38 5 He was also troubled by the fact that the CDC
could not point to violence between cellmates. Perhaps the Chino ri-
ots, which took place in a yard in one of the reception centers, would
show that the policy was narrowly tailored. Still, there is no evidence
that the violence was between cellmates. Thus, even with the evi-
dence of the violence at Chino, it is not clear that the cell assignment
policy passes constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. Because the
narrow-tailoring requirement seems only to permit reactionary mea-
sures, but not prophylactic ones, the violence in California prisons and
jails demonstrates the need for deference to the officials charged with
administering those prisons.38 6 This was precisely the wisdom of Tur-
ner: Officials should be given the ability "to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration." 38 7 The CDC policy at issue in
Johnson is best left to the inquiry from Turner v. Safley.
B. Application of Johnson's Claim to Turner
Although the Court maintained that the claim in Johnson is "not
susceptible to the logic of Turner," both the Ninth Circuit and Justice
Thomas demonstrated that the policy can be analyzed quite cogently
under the Turner factors.3 88 Balancing of the four factors must
demonstrate that the policy is "reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests."389 First, "there must be a 'valid, rational connec-
tion' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it."390 Second, a court must evaluate
"whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that re-
main open to prison inmates."39 1 Third, the court must consider "the
impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally." 39 2 Finally, "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence
of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." 39 3
385. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
387. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
388. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 534-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Johnson, 321 F.3d 791.
389. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
390. Id. (citation omitted).
391. Id. at 90.
392. Id. at 90.
393. Id. at 90 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 86:279
2007] THE SUPREME COURT'S "PRISONER DILEMMA" 329
The first prong requires a valid, rational connection between the
regulation and the legitimate interest put forth to justify it. The peno-
logical objective must be both legitimate and neutral.394 Obviously,
the goals of prison security and the protection of inmates constitute
legitimate, even compelling, penological interests. In Johnson, the
CDC officials' interest was in securing the safety of all inmates and
staff. No cells were designated for persons of a specific race, and no
special treatment was given to or withheld from any inmate based on
race. Further, the policy bore a valid, rational connection to the inter-
est of safety and security. The impact of race on prison life was, and
likely still is, impossible for administrators to ignore. The CDC policy
protected inmates from each other while officials evaluated each in-
mate to determine a permanent placement.
Second, the court must inquire whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right at stake. Where there are other means
of exercising the asserted right, courts should be "particularly con-
scious of the measure of judicial deference" owed to prison officials.
395
In Johnson, the race-based cell-assignment policy was limited to the
60-day reception period. After this time period, inmates generally
were free to select their own cellmates (barring security concerns
about their selections). The rest of the prison was fully integrated,
including work assignments, vocational and educational programs,
dining areas, and exercise and recreational yards.
The third factor looks at the impact that accommodation of the
right will have on other inmates, prison staff, and prison resources.
When accommodation of an inmate's asserted right would have a sig-
nificant impact on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
"particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections offi-
cials."3 96 Accommodation of the right in Johnson-that is, eliminat-
ing race as a factor in assigning cellmates in the reception centers-
would, of course, impact inmates and prison staff. Again, the influ-
ence of racial violence would require prison guards to more closely
monitor the individual cells affecting their ability to patrol other ar-
eas. There is also the obvious concern that racial violence would esca-
late. Fighting between cellmates could easily spill over into other
areas of the prisons and jails. Conversely, race-fueled gang violence
throughout the prison could incite fighting between cellmates.
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the policy's
reasonableness. This is not a "least restrictive alternative" test: the
prison officials do not have to "set up and then shoot down every con-
ceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitu-
394. Id. at 90.
395. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
396. Id. (citation omitted).
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tional complaint."39 7  However, the existence of obvious, easy
alternatives that fully accommodate the inmate's rights at de minimis
cost to valid penological interests "may be evidence that the regulation
is not reasonable," and constitutes "an 'exaggerated response' to
prison concerns."398 The information available to the CDC officials
upon an inmate's arrival is likely inadequate to make a truly informed
decision about that inmate's propensities, thus creating the need for
reception centers in the first place. CDC officials already used infor-
mation other than race when determining initial housing assign-
ments, such as known gang affiliations. 3 99  However, prison
administrators may not be aware of every new inmate's gang member-
ship, and the inmates may not be forthcoming about their past when
questioned. Given the reality of violence within the prison system, the
policy was not an exaggerated response to security concerns. In sum,
the CDC policy was not an unreasonable way of achieving institu-
tional safety and security.
VI. TURNER AT 20: ANALYSIS
It has been twenty years since the Supreme Court formulated the
Turner reasonableness test. Before 2005, the Court applied that test
for all inmate constitutional claims. However, post-2005, the legal
landscape has become much less clear in this area. This part of the
Article will make some observations about the relevant case law and
how Turner fits into constitutional jurisprudence generally. It will
also suggest a few minor modifications to Turner's test and explore
some apparent inconsistencies in the prison rights cases. First, there
is a distinct difference between the compelling interest test now used
for racial classifications in prisons and free exercise claims, and the
deferential Turner test. However, Turner is not as toothless as it may
seem. In fact, it offers a hybrid form of heightened scrutiny. Second,
in some opinions the Court has suggested that some constitutional
rights are "consistent" with incarceration and some are "inconsistent."
Justice Thomas twice has authored opinions arguing that certain
rights simply do not survive incarceration and, for those rights, even
Turner's test is inapplicable. 40 0 Three of the Turner prongs will be
analyzed and discussed in conjunction with the two major observa-
tions outlined above.
397. Id. at 90-91.
398. Id. at 90.
399. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 538 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
400. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582-85 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring); Over-
ton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139-45 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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A. Where Turner Fits into the Constitutional Jurisprudence
Turner v. Safley determined that "when a prison regulation im-
pinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."40 1 As the lan-
guage suggests, the inquiry focuses on the "reasonableness" of the reg-
ulation. Criticism has been launched against the Turner test,
claiming that the test is overly deferential.40 2 A closer look at Tur-
ner's language, however, reveals that it is both deferential and pro-
vides meaningful review.
The Supreme Court has created different constitutional tests, de-
pending on the right at stake. For ordinary claims under the Consti-
tution-that is, where there is no fundamental right or suspect
classification-the Court uses the "rational-basis" test. The chal-
lenger must show that there was no legitimate government purpose,
or that the challenged governmental provision or action was not ra-
tionally-related to a legitimate purpose. This form of inquiry is the
most deferential to the government. 4 03 In other words, this is a two-
step inquiry in which there must first be a legitimate purpose for gov-
ernment action. Then, once some legitimate government purpose has
been identified, "[tihe only remaining question is whether [the govern-
ment] achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational
way."404
The most restrictive inquiry is strict scrutiny, generally used for
rights deemed to be fundamental and certain suspect classifications,
such as race and alienage. Under strict scrutiny, the government
must show that it is working to achieve a compelling interest. The
Court has formulated different versions of the test for the governmen-
tal means of achieving that compelling interest. In one version, the
government must show that its action is necessary to achieve the com-
pelling interest; in other words, it is the only means to achieve the
401. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
402. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to the standard as "categorically deferential"). See also Matthew
P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious
Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 482-85 (1988); Lorijean Golichowski
Oei, Note, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners' Rights: A Turner for the
Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 427-32 (1988); Solove, supra note 200 at 470
("O'Lone ... all but eviscerated the judiciary's role in balancing religious liberty
against governmental and penological interests.").
403. It has been boiled down to this: A governmental action "must be upheld against
... challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
vide a rational basis for the [governmental action]." FCC v. Beach Commc'ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
404. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980) (finding that where there
were plausible reasons for Congressional action making distinctions for retire-
ment benefits between current railroad employees and those who had already
retired, namely, the Court's inquiry is at an end).
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compelling interest in question. Another version requires the govern-
ment action to be the least restrictive alternative. This is the version
of the strict-scrutiny compelling-interest test used by Congress in
RLUIPA.4O5 Another formulation is that the government policy must
be narrowly tailored toward reaching the compelling government in-
terest. This is the test that the Court imposed for the race-based clas-
sifications in Johnson v. California.406
In between the rational-basis test and strict scrutiny lies the aptly-
named intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny applies to cer-
tain classes of fundamental rights (i.e., content-neutral restrictions on
speech, and commercial speech), and certain suspect classifications,
such as those based on gender or legitimacy of birth. Sometimes, it
may be that when a "quasi-fundamental right" is combined with a
"quasi-suspect classification," the standard of review is heightened to
intermediate scrutiny.40 7 Under intermediate scrutiny, the govern-
ment must show that it seeks to achieve an important government
interest and that its action is substantially related to achieving that
interest. In cases of gender classifications, the Court has added that
there must be an "exceedingly persuasive justification."40 8
At first blush, Turner's reasonableness test most closely resembles
the rational-basis test. However, a closer look reveals that Turner is a
form of heightened scrutiny. In the constitutional tests, the analysis
looks at the nature of the government interest; that is, whether the
interest is compelling (strict scrutiny), important (intermediate scru-
tiny), or merely legitimate (rational-basis). Like most formulations of
the rational-basis test, Turner requires only a legitimate penological
interest;40 9 however, Turner also states that the prison regulation
must be "legitimate and neutral."410 Moreover, the prison officials in
405. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b) (2000).
406. 543 U.S. 499, 505, 509 (2005).
407. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding that "illegal aliens" are not a sus-
pect class, but that there was no rational justification for a statute that imposes a
discriminatory burden on their children-who had no control over their status;
and while recognizing that San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), had found that public education is not a fundamental right, it
nevertheless was not merely some governmental benefit indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare).
408. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, noted that in Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court determined that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The
Chief Justice believed that when the Court introduced the requirement that the
State must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification," the Court in-
troduced an element of uncertainty to the existing test. Id. at 559 (citation
omitted).
409. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
410. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
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the cases where the Court has evaluated the claim have always put
forward important, if not compelling, interests to justify the policy at
stake. In all of these cases, the prison officials have named institu-
tional security and safety, rehabilitation, or both as the purpose be-
hind their action. 4 11 The Court in Procunier v. Martinez heightened
scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on correspondence between in-
mates and non-inmates, based on the First Amendment rights of the
non-inmates. 4 12 Martinez stated that regulations must further "an
important or substantial governmental interest" and that "substantial
governmental interests" included "security, order, and rehabilita-
tion."4 13 Likely, almost all prison regulations are aimed at the impor-
tant and pervasive penological interests of security, safety, order, and/
or rehabilitation. When prison officials infringe on the constitutional
rights of the prisoners, there is undoubtedly an important reason for
doing so. Corrections officials could always meet a heightened scru-
tiny version of the "penological interests" half of Turner's "reasonable-
ness" test.
The other half of the test asks whether the regulation is "reasona-
bly related" to the penological goal. This sounds quite similar to the
rational-basis inquiry of whether a governmental action is rationally
related to a government interest. Outside the prison context, the
Court has shown extreme deference when applying the rational-basis
test, looking only for any "reasonably conceivable state of facts"
4 14 to
justify the action, or for indications that the government acted in "a
411. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006) (the prison provided several
justifications, "including the need to motivate better behavior on the part of par-
ticularly difficult prisoners ... and the need to assure prison safety"); Overton v.
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (the prison had "valid interests in maintaining
internal security"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990) ("Prison ad-
ministrators have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and
administrative personnel, but also the duty to take reasonable measures for the
prisoners' own safety.") (citation omitted); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
416 (1989) (the "regulations are expressly aimed at protecting prison security");
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (the rule "was justified
by concerns of institutional order and security," and "[riehabilitative concerns
further supported the policy"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 97 (1987) ("the
Missouri correspondence provision was promulgated primarily for security rea-
sons," and "[pletitioners have identified both security and rehabilitation concerns
in support of the marriage prohibition"). See also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 514 (2005) (the CDC had an interest in the "problems of race-based
violence").
412. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
413. Id. at 413. Martinez dealt with the narrow issue of "direct personal correspon-
dence between inmates and those who have a particularized interest in communi-
cating with them," thus implicating "more than the right of prisoners." Id. at 408.
The decision hinged on the prison rule's "consequential restriction on the First
and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners." Id. at 409
(emphasis added).
414. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
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patently arbitrary or irrational way."4 15 On closer inspection, how-
ever, Turner's fourth prong imposes a more rigorous standard of re-
view. The first prong looks for a "valid rational connection" between
the regulation and the governmental interest.416 Turner also stated
that the asserted goal may not be "so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational."417 This language mirrors that of the tradi-
tional rational-basis test. The fourth prong, though, stated that "the
absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a
prison regulation. By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy
alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable,
but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns."418 The Court ex-
plicitly stated that this was "not a least restrictive alternative test."41 9
This pronouncement obviously eliminates the possibility that this is
strict scrutiny. Justice Stevens in Johnson characterized the fourth
Turner prong as "boil[ing] down to a tailoring test."4 20 Thus, Turner
requires some level of "tailoring," without rising to the strict scrutiny
standard that the policy by "narrowly tailored." Under the traditional
rational-basis examination, where the government needs to show only
a "reasonably conceivable set of facts," an "exaggerated response"
would be permissible. All that must be shown is that the means of
achieving the government objective was not arbitrary or irrational.
The fact that the policy was a "response" at all-even an exaggerated
one-would refute the contention that it was arbitrary or irrational.
Turner, however, goes beyond this extremely permissible language,
expressly disapproving of "exaggerated" responses. The language
fleshing out the fourth Turner prong raises the standard beyond that
of the traditional rational-basis test.
Because Turner's fourth prong subjects prison regulations alleged
to infringe on inmates' constitutional rights to greater than the usual
"relatedness" or "means" inquiry, the Turner reasonableness test must
be understood as a form of heightened scrutiny. Similarly, the impor-
tant or compelling penological interests identified to justify these reg-
ulations belie the suggestion that Turner is not, in practice,
heightened scrutiny. Even the actual language of Turner's "reasona-
bleness test" eviscerates the notion that the test consists of toothless
415. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980).
416. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
417. Id. at 89-90.
418. Id. at 90 (internal quotations and citations omitted)
419. Id. (emphasis added).
420. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 523 n.3 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens expressed the view that the CDC policy was "at best, an 'exaggerated
response' to its asserted security concerns." Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
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review.4 2 1 Mirroring the traditional two-part constitutional inquiries
described above, perhaps the best understanding of this test actually
is: (1) there must be an important penological interest; and (2) the
inmate challenging the restriction must show that the regulation is
not reasonably tailored to that interest. Still, because Turner removes
the burden of strict scrutiny from the prison administrators, it pro-
vides the deference appropriate to those charged with running these
complicated institutions.
In Turner, the Court articulated four factors for considering the
validity of a regulation. Practical application demonstrates that these
factors could benefit from some re-working. Most of the four factors
pertain to the second part of the above test-the reasonable relation
or tailoring, with only the first factor addressing the first part-the
existence of a legitimate penological interest. The first Turner factor
states that "there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put for-
ward to justify it."422 The Court further elaborated: The connection
between the regulation and the asserted justification cannot be so re-
mote as to make the policy arbitrary or irrational.423 Furthermore,
the penological objective must be both "legitimate and neutral."424
This last statement pertains to the first part of the overall test: the
penological objective or interest itself. For the sake of clarity, the rest
of the first factor should be severed from this portion of the factor.
The first part of the test-the penological interest or objective-
should be analyzed independently from the second part-the reasona-
ble relationship or reasonable tailoring-(and the remaining three-
and-a-half factors). Courts will conduct a clearer analysis if the first
factor does not attempt to analyze both parts of the test. A systematic
approach to this inquiry looks to the governmental interest first,
before exploring the relatedness or tailoring aspect. Therefore, the
new first factor is co-extensive with the first part of the test. The pe-
nological interest or objective must be legitimate and neutral; or
under the reformed version of the test, the government's penological
interest must be an important and neutral one.
The remaining elements of the first prong should be combined with
the fourth prong, which states that "the absence of ready alternatives
is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation"4 25 and that
the regulation must not constitute an "exaggerated response to prison
421. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989). The Supreme Court and the
Attorney General of the United States were confident that "a reasonableness
standard is not toothless." Id.
422. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
423. Id. at 89-90.
424. Id. at 90.
425. Id. at 90 (citing Block, 468 U.S. at 587).
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concerns."426 The language from both of these factors merely restates
the second part of the test: that the regulation is "reasonably tailored"
or "reasonably related" to the penological interest. In other words,
there is a valid, logical connection; the regulation is not arbitrary or
irrational; there are no readily available alternatives; and the regula-
tion is not an exaggerated response. The inquiry for each of the for-
mulations essentially is the same. If these elements are not satisfied
there is direct evidence that the regulation is not reasonably tailored
or related. The best manifestation of the Turner standard should first
inquire whether there is an important penological interest, and then
whether the regulation at issue is reasonably tailored toward achiev-
ing that interest.
B. The Wisdom of Turner: How and Why the
"Reasonableness Test" Answers all Constitutional Inquiries
for Prison Inmates
There has been implicit debate in the Court's prisoner rights cases
concerning whether certain rights survive, or the extent to which vari-
ous rights survive, incarceration. Turner4 27 and Harper42S both
looked to whether the right at stake (marriage in Turner, and freedom
from antipsychotic drugs in Harper) was one that could be vindicated
in prison before applying the four factor test. Overton v. Bazzetta
4 29
recognized that a right to association may not survive incarceration.
Other cases simply apply Turner as if it were the test for survivability,
or as if no such question existed. The Court has also made statements
concerning the "consistency" of various rights with incarceration, and
these statements offer no help with the analysis. In both Johnson43
0
and Overton the Court suggested that consistency was a threshold in-
quiry for application of Turner. Logically, the principles of
survivability and consistency are related, but they are not synony-
mous: a right that is inconsistent with incarceration therefore should
not "survive" it, while a right that is not inconsistent may survive in-
carceration. A review of these statements is important, because they
go to the heart of the issue in these cases: the level of constitutional
protection afforded to these rights. The question that arises is
whether Turner is the test applied after it has been determined that a
right "survives" incarceration, or whether Turner makes that determi-
nation itself. Similarly, is a right's consistency with incarceration a
threshold determination, or a constituent part of Turner? The analy-
sis below concludes that there should be no preliminary questions
426. Id. at 90.
427. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
428. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
429. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
430. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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about the survivability of constitutional rights or their consistency
with incarceration. Instead, Turner evaluates whether a right actu-
ally survives, while any issue of a right's consistency with imprison-
ment should be considered as part of Turner's second prong. This
provides the most simple and logical approach for ana]yzing prisoner
rights claims.
When considering these issues, it is important to note the level of
abstraction of the right at stake. For example, there is a broad right
to the free exercise of religion, which may encompass a specific right to
attend particular religious services. In most early instances, the situ-
ation was straightforward. The Turner standard appeared to test
whether the particular right survives. Turner stated that prisoners
retain "the protections of the Constitution," but that courts should de-
fer to the reasoned judgment of prison administrators.4 3 1 Later the
same term, O'Lone stated that the withdrawal or limitation of consti-
tutional rights due to incarceration leads to the use of a relaxed stan-
dard for prisoner's constitutional claims.432 These principles led the
Court to enunciate the "reasonableness" test for inmates' constitu-
tional claims. 43 3 The deferential quality of the test recognizes that
the Constitution may not extend as far in prison as it does in the
outside world, but that the cloak of constitutional protection is still
worn in prison. The mere use of a deferential test says nothing about
whether the right continues; accordingly, application of the Turner
test determines whether the constitutional right survives. Turner's
second factor looks to "whether there are alternative means of exercis-
ing the right that remain open to the prison inmates,"4 34 implying
that other aspects of the broad right survive. The determination by
Turner of survival, then, is over the particular, or narrow, right.
In Turner and O'Lone, claims were made based on broad First
Amendment rights where a particular right was impinged. In Turner,
the Court found that the prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence restric-
tion did not foreclose all means of expression and did "not unconstitu-
tionally abridge the First Amendment rights of prison inmates."4 3 5 In
O'Lone, the Court recognized that inmates retain their right to free
exercise of religion, but that the particular restriction, which pre-
vented some Muslim prisoners from attending Jumu'ah services, was
not unconstitutional.436 O'Lone acknowledged that there were no al-
ternative means of attending Jumu'ah, but that the appropriate ques-
tion under Turner's second prong was whether the inmates could
431. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
432. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1987).
433. Id. at 349-50; Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-89.
434. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-89, 90.
435. Id. at 92, 93.
436. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348, 353.
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participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. 43 7 In both cases,
the particular right was found to have been extinguished-or, not to
have survived-constitutionally. Still, the broad First Amendment
right lived on.
Other analyses were equally uncomplicated. When Thornburgh v.
Abbott turned to the validity of a regulation which authorized prison
officials to reject incoming publications found to be detrimental to in-
stitutional security, it was noted that for Turner's second prong, "the
right in question" should be examined "expansively."438 The regula-
tion passed muster, in part because it permitted "a broad range of
publications to be sent, received, and read."43 9 Justice Thomas' dis-
sent in Johnson found there to be alternative means of exercising the
right to equal protection because of the full integration of the prison
beyond the cells of the reception areas.4 40 This implicitly recognized
that the broad right of equal protection survived incarceration, even if
the narrow right not to be assigned an initial 60-day cellmate based in
part on the race of the inmates did not. Neither Abbott nor Justice
Thomas' dissent in Johnson performed a preliminary inquiry about
the right's survivability.
Rights found under the Due Process Clause necessarily must be
evaluated individually and should not be evaluated as part of the
broader constitutional right of due process. Because of the specific na-
ture of the right, the Court has gone through a certain threshold in-
quiry concerning that right's "survivability" in prison. Before getting
to the application of the "reasonableness" test, the Turner Court found
there to be "a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the
prison context."441 After determining that the marriage right sur-
vived incarceration, the Court held that its restriction did "not with-
stand scrutiny."442 For obvious reasons, the Court did not look at
whether the regulation allowed alternative means of exercising that
right. This procedure is in contravention to the above conclusions
about a reviewing court's determination about the survivability of a
constitutional right. For this claim, the Court first concluded that the
right to marriage survived and then applied the reasonableness test.
In Washington v. Harper, Harper "possesse[d] a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
despite his incarceration.44 3 The Court then proceeded to examine
437. Id. at 352-53.
438. 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989).
439. Id. at 418.
440. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 536 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
441. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
442. Id. at 97.
443. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
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the "extent of a prisoner's right under the [Due Process] Clause to
avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs" because of
the inmate's incarceration. 4 44 The Court described the Special Of-
fender Center ("SOC") policy and found that the protections afforded
by the State met "the demands of the Due Process Clause."44 5 Thus,
the Court made a preliminary determination that the right at stake
survived, but could be narrowed, in prison. The Court then went on to
analyze the program under Turner. Harper did not use the second
Turner prong.446 Applying the other Turner factors, the Court deter-
mined that "given the requirements of the prison environment, the
Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in
the inmate's medical interest."447 The analyses in Harper and Turner
dealt only with particular rights; neither decision addressed a particu-
lar right which is part of a broader right (e.g., the right of free speech).
This difference complicated the landscape concerning the survivability
question. These due process cases performed a threshold inquiry
about the "survivability" of a right, and then looked to whether the
restriction of that right was permissible. Although both rights "sur-
vived" in prison, the right in Harper was permissibly abridged, despite
its so-called survival. In contrast, in Turner, O'Lone, and Abbott, the
"reasonableness" test made the survivability of the right and the con-
stitutionality of the regulation synonymous inquiries.
In Overton v. Bazzetta, the claim involved the freedom of associa-
tion as it pertains to personal relations, particularly as it related to an
inmate's visitors.448 The Court observed that the "freedom of associa-
tion is among the rights least compatible with incarceration," and that
"[s]ome curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison
context."44 9 The Court explicitly refrained from holding that "the
right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incarcera-
tion" and declined "to explore or define the asserted right of associa-
tion at any length or determine the extent to which it survives
incarceration because the challenged regulations" passed muster
under the test from Turner.4 5 0 Overton, then, suggests that there is a
threshold question of whether a right survives incarceration before
444. Id. at 222.
445. Id. at 222-23.
446. Id. at 224. The Court stated, "In Turner, we considered various factors to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant
here." Id.
447. Id. at 224-27 (quoted language at 227).
448. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
449. Id. at 131.
450. Id. at 131-32.
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the reviewing court should turn to the Turner inquiry, though it de-
clined to take up that threshold question.
In both Overton and Beard v. Banks, Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment and wrote separately. 45 1 Justice Thomas is of the view
that "[rather than asking in the abstract whether a certain right 'sur-
vives' incarceration, the Court should ask whether a particular pris-
oner's lawful sentence took away a right enjoyed by free persons."452
Because the Constitution itself does not define incarceration, "States
are free to define and redefine all types of punishment, including im-
prisonment, to encompass various types of deprivations-provided
only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment."4 5 3 Thus, the proper inquiry "is whether a sentence validly de-
prives the prisoner of a constitutional right enjoyed by ordinary, law-
abiding persons."4 54 Whether a sentence includes the extinction of a
constitutional right is a question of state law, since "it is a state's pre-
rogative to determine how it will punish violations of its law."4 5
5 Jus-
tice Thomas suggests that the Court's Turner analysis can be read as
recognizing that certain prison regulations-those that satisfy the
four Turner factors-are presumptively included within a sentence of
imprisonment.4 56 His view on the states' right to define imprison-
ment would require a reexamination of the Court's prisoner rights ju-
risprudence, because constitutional protections do not always apply in
prison.457 Courts should first inquire whether the right survives in-
carceration, and if it does, whether a restriction of that right has a
reasonable relationship with a legitimate penological interest.
458
Despite the language in Turner's analysis of the marriage restric-
tion, Harper, Overton, and Justice Thomas' dissents, Turner should be
understood as determining the constitutionality of prison regulations,
encompassing all questions concerning whether a constitutional right
"survives." There is no need for a threshold survivability analysis.
Naturally, the survivability issue refers only to the particular right in
question and should be framed as whether the particular right prop-
erly defeats the regulation at issue, rather than if it survives incarcer-
ation generally. Turner admonishes that "[pirison walls do not form a
451. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring); Overton,
539 U.S. at 138 (Thomas, J., concurring).
452. Overton, 539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring).
453. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Overton, 539 U.S.
at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
454. Overton, 539 U.S. at 140 (Thomas, J., concurring).
455. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted);
Overton, 539 U.S. at 140 (Thomas, J., concurring).
456. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring); Overton, 539 U.S. at 140-42
(Thomas, J., concurring).
457. Overton, 539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring).
458. Id.
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barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Consti-
tution."459 Because the Constitution continues to protect the inmate
while in jail, a constitutional test is applied to the inmates' claims.
The constitutional test guarantees constitutional protection, even if
the right does not ultimately "survive." Accordingly, all claims validly
brought under the Constitution are entitled to a constitutional in-
quiry. A threshold inquiry for right survival unnecessarily compli-
cates the claim particularly when the courts then apply Turner to
determine the constitutionality of the regulation at issue. In addition,
the syntax that must be used for a threshold test demonstrates the
apparent redundancy: first, the court asks whether a right survives
incarceration, and then determines if a regulation may validly take
that "surviving" right away. Moreover, this may produce seemingly
inconsistent results: rights that supposedly "survive" incarceration
may then be inconsistent with penological goals and permissibly be
abridged. The best focus is for the reviewing court to determine a
right's so-called survival, and the regulation's constitutionality, sim-
ply by applying Turner.
This more compelling "survivability" formulation is at odds with
Justice Thomas' opinions in Overton and Beard. Although the states
are free to impose lawful penalties for infractions of the law, this state
prerogative does not trump the federal Constitution. Justice Thomas
felt that the proper inquiry was whether the state validly deprived a
prisoner of a constitutional right, focusing on the power of the state.
However, a state may not abridge rights protected by the federal Con-
stitution, unless its action passes constitutional scrutiny. Justice
Thomas' inquiry would not necessarily put the state's action through
constitutional scrutiny. The appropriate analysis must look at
whether a right that was deprived by the state was done so in manner
that violated the federal Constitution. Turner is the means of measur-
ing the protection of the Constitution; that is, whether the right "sur-
vives" the battle with the prison regulation, and whether the state
acted properly. If the right truly "survives," then infringement of that
right is unconstitutional.
Adding to the prisoner rights jargon, some cases have claimed that
particular rights are inconsistent with incarceration. Shaw v. Murphy
stated that "[iin the First Amendment context . . . some rights are
simply inconsistent with the status of a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system."460 Shaw indicated
that certain particular rights under the First Amendment were not
consistent with incarceration, as was the case with Turner's claim con-
459. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Shaw v. Mur-
phy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001) (noting that "incarceration does not divest prison-
ers of all constitutional protections").
460. 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
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cerning inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 46 1  This observation,
though, does not indicate whether Turner's test is the mechanism for
determining whether a right is consistent with incarceration, or
whether a right's inconsistency with incarceration is part of the Tur-
ner determination, or if consistency with incarceration is a threshold
matter. The Johnson Court claimed that Turner had been applied
only to rights that are "inconsistent with proper incarceration,"4 62 but
it did not offer any elaboration as to why each of the other rights to
which Turner had been applied was not consistent with incarceration,
or whether the inconsistency referred to the broad right or the particu-
lar one. By claiming that the "reasonableness" test only had been
used with rights that were inconsistent with incarceration, the Court
suggested that the "consistent with incarceration" question was re-
solved prior to applying the Turner test and, in fact, was determina-
tive of whether Turner was the appropriate standard. The Court
claimed that the equal protection right in Johnson survived incarcera-
tion and was "not susceptible to the logic of Turner."4 63 Notably,
neither Johnson nor Shaw cited O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. Simi-
larly, neither case referred to the free exercise of religion, or to the
particular right to attend religious services, as being inconsistent with
incarceration. Assumedly, this is because free exercise of religion is
entirely consistent with incarceration, and the application of Turner to
these rights defies the logic of Johnson and Shaw's assertions. Akin to
Overton's discussion of survivability, the Overton Court also asserted
that inmates do not "retain rights inconsistent with proper incarcera-
tion," and that "freedom of association is among the rights least com-
patible with incarceration."4 64 The Court seemingly made consistency
and compatibility nearly synonymous with the "survivability" issue of
a constitutional right. Nonetheless, the inmate was not totally de-
prived of that right by the prison regulation. Although visitations
were limited, there were alternative means of communication-that
is, of exercising the constitutional right asserted-such as sending
messages through those who may receive visitors, letter writing, and
the use of the telephone. 4 65 Thus, under the Court's analysis, several
particular rights under the broader right of association survived incar-
ceration, despite the clear inconsistency of freedom of association with
incarceration.
In Beard v. Banks, prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit
("LTSU") level 2 were prohibited from having newspapers, magazines
and photographs. Inmates challenged the policy as violating their
461. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 93).
462. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005).
463. Id.
464. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
465. Id. at 135.
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rights under the First Amendment.466 As to Turner's second factor,
there were "no alternative means of exercising the right."46 7 Though
inmates have the ability to graduate to level 1, or out of the LTSU
altogether, while they are in level 2 they have no access to the prohib-
ited materials.468 This contrasts with Thornburgh v. Abbott,469 where
the regulation still permitted an inmate to possess a broad range of
publications. The absence of an alternative means of exercising the
right, though, is not conclusive about the overall "reasonableness" of
the policy.470 Policies which withdraw various privileges may always
satisfy Turner's first factor, but will always fall short on the second.4
7 1
Without looking to whether a "right" to such materials survived incar-
ceration, or was compatible with it, the Court obviously found that a
proscription of that right was permissible.
The Court has been inconsistent in its own discussion of whether a
right "survives" incarceration, or whether a right is "consistent" with
the fact of incarceration or penological goals, or even whether it is
"compatible" with such a situation. The muddy nomenclature in this
field further complicates constitutional inquiry in an already multi-
faceted procedure. When a right is invoked by a claimant, the Court
clearly does not always undertake a threshold inquiry into whether
that right has "survived." As Overton observed, it is not necessary to
perform a preliminary analysis in order to conduct Turner applica-
tion.4 72 Because the prison regulations often abridge a particular
right completely, a determination of the constitutionality of the regu-
lation functionally determines whether that particular right actually
has "survived." Furthermore, the Court has not been uniform in its
discussion of a right's consistency with incarceration or penological
goals: sometimes this allegedly determines whether Turner should be
applied, while in other situations, it seems merely to be a justification
for Turner's deference itself. A simple reconciliation of the above cases
and statements is possible and advisable.
The Turner test should be applied to any inmate's constitutional
challenge. This analysis necessarily focuses on the particular right,
which the prison regulations tend to deny altogether. Appropriately,
none of the Court's "prisoner rights" cases examined broad rights in
any detail, except as they related to the Turner test's second prong.
The correct inquiry is whether a right-a particular right-may be
abridged in the prison context, not whether the broad right survives.
466. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
467. Id. at 2579 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
468. Id.
469. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
470. Id. at 2580 (citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 135).
471. Id. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
472. Overton, 539 U.S. at 131-32.
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Any exploration of the broad right has an appropriate place within
Turner's second prong. In other words, the real question is whether a
prison regulation passes constitutional muster, and Turner is the all-
purpose test for that inquiry. All of the cases which applied the Tur-
ner test can easily be reconciled to this approach. Often, the particu-
lar rights in those cases did not "survive" because the regulations were
reasonably related to legitimate penological goals. These rights were
inmate-to-inmate correspondence in Turner, the right to attend
Jumu'ah services in O'Lone, the right to receive publications deemed
inappropriate by prison officials in Abbott, the absolute right to avoid
administration of antipsychotic drugs in Harper, the right to personal
visitations in Overton, and the right to publications and photographs
in Beard. The right to marriage, though, under circumstances free
from the regulation in Turner, did survive incarceration.
Finally, the question of whether a right is consistent with incarcer-
ation should be considered as part of Turner's second prong. This
should include both an examination of the broad constitutional right
as well as the particular right at stake. This prong, which looks at
"whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that re-
main open to prison inmates" 4 73 already examines the nature of the
broad right being challenged. This makes it a suitable place to con-
sider whether the right invoked is compatible with incarceration. For
example, O'Lone considered an inmate's broad right to free exercise,
including whether alternative means of exercising that right ex-
isted.474 Implicitly, such issues consider whether these rights are ap-
propriate in prison, or whether they are "consistent" with
incarceration. Similarly, in Overton, the Court noted that the broad
right to association is not "consistent" with incarceration; however,
the Court still considered other forms of association available to the
inmate, as well as the particular visitation right's consistent with in-
carceration.4 75 A right's consistency with incarceration logically is
part of the question of a regulation's reasonableness and belongs as
part of the Turner inquiry. Furthermore, when a regulation com-
pletely denies a right, as in Beard and Turner, leaving no alternative
means of exercising that right, an examination of whether that right
is consistent with incarceration is entirely appropriate.
Just as with survivability, there is no need for a preliminary deter-
mination of consistency. The protections of the Constitution warrant
a constitutional inquiry. The nature of the right at stake necessarily
is part of that query. This is more appropriate than making a thresh-
old inquiry about "consistency" and then applying Turner. Because a
right's consistency with incarceration is related to whether there are
473. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
474. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987).
475. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003).
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alternative means of exercising the broad right, the second prong of
Turner is the suitable place for such an analysis. If the right is not
compatible with prison, there would be no reason for there to be alter-
native means of exercising that right. Accordingly, the second prong
should consider both the nature of the right at stake including its con-
sistency with incarceration, and whether alternate means exist of ex-
ercising that broad right.
VII. CONCLUSION
The congruity of Turner's application that had been the hallmark
of the Supreme Court's prisoner rights jurisprudence came to an ab-
rupt halt in 2005. Johnson departed from the Turner line of cases, but
the Johnson Court did not adequately confront and resolve the tension
between those cases and the need for equal protection when the gov-
ernment uses racial classifications. Moreover, the situation in Califor-
nia, including events that occurred post-Johnson, pointedly
demonstrates the need for deference to prison administrators. Addi-
tionally, Congress' enactment of RLUIPA contributed to the erosion of
the unitary prisoner rights standard. The Court recognized the con-
stitutionality of RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkinson, and a review of
Spending Clause precedent shows that Congress may impose a new
standard of review for any other constitutional right. The cumulative
effect of RLUIPA, Cutter, Johnson, and Beard is uncertainty in the
field of inmate constitutional rights. A careful review of case law and
policy rationale reveals that the Turner standard is the appropriate
test for all inmate claims. Even though the "reasonableness test" is
deferential to corrections officials, it is, in effect, a form of heightened
scrutiny. Courts should recognize that the language in the four
prongs goes beyond the traditional rational-basis inquiry. The Court's
prior usage of the Turner test has produced some language that could
be cleaned-up, leaving Turner as a straightforward test, albeit with
multiple factors. The proper understanding of Turner is that it deter-
mines the extent to which a particular constitutional right applies in
prison, while simultaneously determining the constitutionality of the
challenged regulation. The two issues are resolved in like fashion.
Any questions of consistency or compatibility of a right with incarcera-
tion should be considered as part of Turner's second prong. The re-
tooled version of Turner described above provides the most fitting
method of analyzing inmate constitutional claims. Evaluation of pris-
oners' rights is rife with challenges, both for courts and the prison ad-
ministrators, and Congress and the Court have created a prisoner
dilemma.
